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Preface
Natural resources endowments (and oil, in particular) are often argued to af-
fect in a negative manner both the political and economic stance of a country.
According to a wide literature there seems to be also evidence that natural re-
sources affect positively the likelihood of internal conflicts. In addition, natural
resources are believed to have negative effects on the democratization process
of a country.
This first essay aims at examining several issues concerning the politics of oil
producing countries with particular reference to the political transition of au-
thoritarian regimes. In particular, our research tries to explore the impact that
rents from natural resources (and, in particular, oil) have on the establishment
of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy
perspective is employed. A simple game theoretical approach is presented and
discussed in order to explain the relationships between oil revenues, political
instability and emergence of different political regimes.
The implementation of particular redistributive fiscal policies together with the
possibility that paternalistic or “predatory” autocracies emerge are considered.
Since a process of full democratization is argued not to represent an optimal
choice for the oil-rich authoritarian nations, governments prefer to remain au-
xiii
tocratic. However, in order to prevent internal conflicts from occurring, author-
itarian countries have either to undertake redistributive activities or allow for
a military regime. Under other circumstances, political instability is the likely
outcome.
Moreover, results from comparative statics exercises suggest that, ceteris paribus,
governments of countries characterized by a low degree of socio-political frag-
mentation are more likely to adopt military regimes. On the contrary, the proba-
bility that redistributive autocracies will be adopted increases when the popula-
tion of the country presents high levels of heterogeneity. Finally, higher natural
resource endowments increase the possibility that policies aimed at redistribut-
ing oil rents are implemented.
There is a large body of research which tries to assess how oil shocks influence
the business cycle of oil producing countries. According to many empirical pa-
pers, countries which are endowed with relevant natural resources are charac-
terized by lower economic growth rates with respect to countries with few nat-
ural resources. Previous literature has also suggested that different mechanisms
of transmission of exogenous oil shocks are responsible for the negative effects
on the economic performances of oil exporting countries (see Alexeev and Con-
rad, 2009 for a recent review of the literature).
Our second essay aims at providing further evidence on the role of sectoral re-
allocation between private and public sectors in explaining the impact of shocks
to oil revenues on the economic growth rates of oil producing countries. The ef-
fects of oil shocks on the business cycle of oil producing countries are examined
by distinguishing between various components of public sector spending pol-
icy: purchases of consumption goods, investments in productive activities and
compensation for public employees.
xiv
Simulation results from a simple theoretical model suggest that a large fraction
of the negative effects of shocks to oil revenues on the private sector of the econ-
omy can be explained by crowding-out effects of public over private invest-
ments. Since the growth of the public sector is not able to compensate for the
reduction in size of the private sector, an increase in oil revenues has the effect
to decrease total output and employment. Finally, numerical results suggest that
countries which are characterized by lower levels of private investments in the
steady state are less affected by an exogenous oil shock with respect to countries
where private investments have the higher share in total output.
In the third essay, decisions behind production levels for oil exporting countries
are studied by means of both theoretical and empirical models. Under the as-
sumptions of exogenous oil prices andworld oil demand, we are able to describe
how decisions on oil production levels vary according to changes of conditions
on the world oil market. We argue that an important factor which is able to affect
these decisions is represented by the cost structure of oil producing countries.
Results from the simulation of our theoretical model suggest that oil production
changes are strongly correlated with changes in world oil demand and real oil
price changes. However, although producing countries show a significant rela-
tionship between their output levels and total demand, the effect of oil prices on
oil production decisions seems to be much lower.
By means of econometric analysis based on cointegration techniques, different
responses to world oil demand and real oil prices seem to characterize decisions
of relevant oil producting countries. As far as the responses to changes in total
demand are concerned, production adjusts with few lags to increases in con-
sumption. On the contrary, responses by oil production levels to innovations
in real oil prices are argued to be much lower. In addition, when asymmet-
xv
ric econometric are introduced, evidence of nonlinear effects of output levels to
shocks in demand levels and oil prices is found.
Finally, according to our theoretical framework, an upward sloping Kaplan-
Meier hazard function is valid for oil producers’ decisions on output levels. This
result is confirmed when an empirical model is applied to time-series represent-
ing oil production levels.
Our research presents several interesting avenues for future analyses. With re-
gards to the political economy of oil producing countries, the model presented
in the first essay could be easily generalized in order to introduce a dynamic
framework. Similarly, future research on the fiscal policy of oil exporting coun-
tries could be aimed at formulating additional guidelines for spending decisions
by governments of oil rich countries. The possibility to extend the framework
considered here in order to allow for inter-temporal decisions on the accumula-
tion of financial wealth over the period of oil production represents an interest-
ing topic for future studies. Finally, the theoretical model considered in the third
essay could be extended in order to describe the behavior of the Organization
of exporting countries (in particular, as far as the modeling of the relationship
between production decisions and changes in world oil demand is concerned).
xvi
Originalities of the Thesis
Our research is argued to contribute significantly to the existing literature. By
focusing on relevant topics in the field of political economy, fiscal policy and mi-
croeconomic theory, our analysis tries to provide some answers to issues not yet
well addressed by researchers and analysts in previous works. The introduc-
tion of a theoretical framework which endogenizes the emergence of different
political regimes in a context of a rentier state represents the most relevant con-
tribution to the existing literature of the first essay. In this article, the impact of
relevant variables (i.e. degree of socio-political fragmentation of the society, size
of natural resources endowments, etc.) is also studied in greater detail.
The second essay extends the previous literature on the macroeconomic effects
of exogenous oil shocks on the economic stance of oil exporting countries in
various directions. The hypothesis that oil price shocks drive large aggregate re-
allocation of production factor is investigated by several previous studies. How-
ever, earlier works lack the sectoral detail on job creation and destruction that
we examine.
Although previous research has already considered the determinants of deci-
sions on oil production levels, relatively few studies have examined the elasticity
of these decisions to changes in the stance of world oil markets. Our third study
aims, in particular, at filling the gap in our understanding of the relationship
between oil production levels, international oil prices and world oil demand.
At this purpose, results from both a theoretical model and an empirical analysis
are presented. The implications of our results with regard to the effects on the
overall structure of the markets are, hence, discussed.
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Chapter 1
Management of External Rents and
Political Transition of Authoritarian
Regimes
Natural resources are generally associated to negative economic effects. This pa-
per explores the impact that rents from natural resources (and, in particular, oil)
have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous liter-
ature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple game theoretical
approach in order to explain the relationships between oil revenues, political
instability (conflicts) and emergence of different political systems is presented.
The implementation of particular redistributive fiscal policies together with the
possibility that paternalistic or “predatory” autocracies emerge are considered.
Since a process of full democratization is argued not to represent an optimal
choice for the oil-rich authoritarian nations, governments prefer to remain au-
tocratic. However, in order to prevent internal conflicts from occurring, author-
1
itarian countries have either to undertake redistributive activities or allow for
a military regime. Under other circumstances, political instability is the likely
outcome. Moreover, results from comparative statics exercise suggest that, ce-
teris paribus, governments of low fragmented countries are likely to adopt mil-
itary regimes. On the contrary, the probability that redistributive autocracies
will be adopted increases when the population of the country presents high lev-
els of heterogeneity. As natural resource endowments increase, the possibility
to implement generous redistribution of oil rents becomes a more interesting
solution.
1.1 Introduction
Natural resources endowments (and oil, in particular) are often argued to af-
fect in a negative manner both the economic and political stance of a country
(“resource curse”). According to a wide literature (see, among others, [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5], [6], [7]) there seems to be evidence that natural resources affect pos-
itively the likelihood of internal conflicts.1 An additional channel by means of
which a curse of natural resources endowments may arise is represented by the
“oil-impedes-democracy” claim (see [9]): natural resources (and oil, in particu-
lar) have negative effects on the democratization process of a country.2
1According to [8], even a phenomenonwith “numerous complex social and historical causes”
like the Iranian Revolution (1979) can be interpreted as a social movement directed at a better
distribution of oil revenues.
2As a partial consequence of these phenomena, several authors (for instance, [10], [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19] - for a different viewpoint, see, among others, [20]) argue
that there is strong evidence that countries with large natural resources tend to grow slower
than countries with small amounts of the natural resource. In particular, recent works (see,
2
Different works (both theoretical and empirical) have, consequently, attempted
to describe the channels by which resource wealth negatively influences the
polities of exporting countries.3 [9] argues that oil affects democracy through,
mainly, three main mechanisms of transmission: a “rentier hypothesis”, oil rev-
enues are employed by governments in an attempt to reduce grievances by the
population; a “repression” mechanism, natural resource wealth is used for mil-
itary or “internal security spending”4 and a “modernization” effect: according
to this theory, economic development is a key factor in boosting a democratiza-
tion process. Since a resource boom is not able to “produce cultural and social
changes”, a democratization process is prevented from occurring.5
Econometric evidence seems to confirm these assertions. Empirical results are
consistent with a negative and statistically significant impact of oil on the process
of democratization of countries ([9]). [27] finds a strongly significant relation-
ship between resource dependence (as measured by the ratio of primary exports
to gross domestic product, GDP) and the emergence of authoritarian regimes.
[4]’s results support, from an empirical point of view, the linkages between nat-
ural resource abundance and the emergence of authoritarian political regimes
for African nations. By using as indicator of democracy the thirty-year change
in the policy index, [28] shows negative effects of oil discoveries on the levels of
democracy of a country, an effect that persists even if large Middle East coun-
inter alia, [21], [18], [17], [19] and [22] have argued that natural resource-rich countries could
avoid negative economic effects from a resource boom should they adopt good policies and
institutions.
3Earlier studies that links natural resources to the emergence of authoritarian regimes are the
analyses by [23] and [24].
4See also [25].
5Similarly, [26] considers as factors that may help to explain the linkages between “oil wealth
and regime survival” the “rentier state”, the repression and the rent-seeking theses.
3
tries are included in the analysis.
In an analysis aimed at determining the impact of oil wealth on regime failure,
antistate protests and domestic armed conflict, [26] argues that the oil depen-
dence variable (ratio of the value of oil exports to GDP) does affect in a posi-
tive manner the durability of a regime. By contrast, the impact on the level of
protests and civil wars is suggested to be negative. According to the author, the
investment of oil revenues in order to establish good institutions could be able
to guarantee the “regime survival”.
[29] examines the relationship between “rentierism” (that is, rent revenues as a
fraction of total government revenues) and democracy indexes. According to
empirical evidence, the net effect of rentierism on democracy is not statistically
relevant.6
Finally, [31] and [32] describe detrimental effect of oil on democracy and eco-
nomic growth. According to their analysis, the ownership structure of the na-
tional oil industry and how revenues are distributed represent, respectively, the
main explanation of the causality link.
Other articles try to categorize exporting nations by specifying different tipolo-
gies of political regimes. [33] suggests a classification based on the definitions
of “autonomous” (in the two versions of “benevolent” and “predatory” states)
and “factional” states (with the two categories of “oligarchic” state and “majori-
tarian” democracies). Similarly, in an effort directed at extending the classifica-
tion of the economic policies of oil-exporting nations, [34] compare (“mature” or
“factional”) democratic systems and autocracies. Hence, while in “predatory”
autocracies, the self-seeking of the ruling party is directed at maximizing net
rents from the sale of the natural resource, in “reformist” (or “paternalistic”)
6Similar results are obtained by [30] in an analysis of U.S. data.
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autocracies natural resource revenues are employed in order to boost economic
growth and raise population’s living standards.
In a study aimed at studying the relationship between natural resources rents
and the policies implemented by governments, [35] find that governments may
reduce the provision of public goods in order to “facilitate patronage politics”.
According to [14], “predatory” and “factional” governments are the result of de-
pendence of the economy of the country on the export of natural resources. In
such a context, repression may emerge as an instrument to ensure political legit-
imacy.
This paper is aimed at studying with the causal relationship between oil rents
and political transition in authoritarian regimes. How do natural resource en-
dowments interact with the emergence of a particular type of political regime?
Why do oil rich countries often switch towards paternalistic or “predatory”
regimes instead of choosing a democratic regime? In addition, one of the ob-
jectives of the present study is to investigate why, despite the possibility to im-
plement a redistributive fiscal policy, political instability may arise under equi-
librium.7
With regard to the factors that determine the emergence of redistributive or mil-
itary systems, this research points out that, in order to study how managing
natural resources revenues affect the socio-political institutions of country, a re-
searcher has to employ a political economy perspective. Based on previous lit-
erature (see, inter alia [36], [37], [38] and [39]), this paper considers an intuitive
game theoretical model in order to link the onset of internal conflicts to the pos-
sibility that alternative political systems emerge. In particular, the transition of
an authoritarian regime towards either one of three different political regimes,
7As the experience of Congo Brazzaville shows (see, also, footnote 38).
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namely, democratic systems, redistributive or military autocracies is modelled
by employing a simple framework. The channel by means of which oil affect
the emergence of a particular regime I focus on is the so-called “rentier effect”.8
Wealth from the exploitation of natural resources is employed in order to reduce
threats of internal conflict.9 The most relevant contribution of the present work
to the existent literature is the introduction of a theoretical framework which en-
dogenizes the emergence of different political regimes in a context of a rentier
state.10
The main idea of the theoretical model can be better specified as follows: since
natural resource-rich countries are characterized by higher levels of grievances
by the population (in order to allow for a better redistribution of natural re-
source) a high degree of political violence may, consequently, arise. The possibil-
ity to employ oil wealth in order to offset threats of political conflict is considered
by the government’s ruler. If some conditions are satisfied, a complete transition
through authoritarian to a democratic systemmay occur. However, this political
transition may not represent a first best choice. Rather, in authoritarian politi-
cal systems, incumbent politicians are able to employ natural resource wealth
8According to [9], a rentier state is “a state that derives a large fraction of its revenues from
external rents”.
9In this paper, the terms “conflict”, “revolution”, “revolt” and “political instability” are used
interchangeably.
10[40] and [41] present formal theories in order to explain why, under some circumstances,
resource wealth is able to impede democracy. Even if some conclusions are similar to mine (for
instance, the fact that the size of the natural resource represents a relevant factor in determining
authoritarian regimes), the present analysis focuses on the emergence of different typologies of
political systems. The taxonomy of authoritarian regimes introduced by [34] is, in particular,
employed.
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in order to maintain support and even consolidate their political power through
either a redistributive policy or the adoption of a military regime.
In addition, the theoretical model predicts that factors that affect political changes
towards redistributive or “predatory” activities are the size of the natural re-
source endowment, the number of political groups that compose the country,
and, finally, on parameters that represent the warfare technology. In particu-
lar, more fragmented countries are likely to implement redistributive policies.
On the contrary, countries with low-levels of fragmentation will tend to adopt
military regimes. As an additional result, I will be able to prove that, while
resource-rich countries will adopt paternalistic autocratic regimes, in countries
with relatively low amount of natural resource military regimes could emerge.
Finally, a glance at the data for a sample of authoritarian oil exporting countries
seems to confirm this theoretical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the theoretical model.
Section 1.2.1 illustrates the structure of the game. A sequential three-stage game
is introduced. Section 1.2.2 presents the main assumptions of the game. Section
1.2.3 presents the equilibrium outcome of the model. In particular, the actions
that can be implemented by the ruling party of an authoritarian regime and, in
particular, the possibility to adopt a democratic regime, the implementation of
either redistributive or “predatory” policies are considered. Section 1.3.1 offers
the final result, concerning the policy undertaken by both democratic and au-
thoritarian governments. Results of comparative statics exercises together with
evidence based on data analysis and implications for economic development are
presented in Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, respectively. Section 2.4 concludes.11
11Proofs and mathematical derivations of the main results of the paper are given in the Ap-
pendix.
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1.2 The theoretical model. Introduction
Consider an economy composed by a government (B) and a set of N ≥ 2 ex-
cluded (socio-political) groups (i = A1, A2, . . . , AN , peasants, in short i = 1, 2, . . . , N ).
For simplicity, the size of the population of a country is normalized to unity. That
is to say, all groups are composed by a fraction 1
N+1
of individuals. In addition,
they are assumed to be ex-ante homogenous with respect to the total natural re-
source endowment.
1.2.1 Structure of the game
The model can be described as a three-stage game.12 In the first stage of the
game, an endowment of natural resources (R > 0)13 is discovered. Since this
study has the aim to study the relationship between natural resources, conflicts
and political regimes, it is assumed that the rent (from abroad) accrues to the
government of the country (group B, ruling party). As far as the endowments
of natural resources, while each excluded agent owns an amount of natural re-
source R0 (equal across individuals), after the discovery, the government is en-
dowed with an amount of natural resource equal to RB ≡ R0 +R.
12In the following analysis, I abstract from considering the impact of economic growth on the
emergence of different political regimes. However, the extension of the framework in order to
account for such relationship is immediate. It suffices to consider a stage (1bis) in which a high
(or low) economic regime is revealed.
13In the analysis of the present paper, I focus on the discovery of oil fields. In fact, as argued
by [42] in a survey of articles on natural resources and civil wars, oil discoveries and the onset of
conflict are positively correlated. On the contrary, “lootable” commodities (e.g. gemstones and
drugs) are associated to the duration of the conflict.
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In the second stage, (and assuming an authoritarian regime), the ruling party
has to decide between three alternatives: 1) whether to set a fiscal policy which
grants a redistribution of the natural resource revenues in favor of the peasants;
2) provide a (direct or indirect, i.e. by means of a program of public spending)
redistribution of the natural resource among citizens or 3) accelerate a process
of militarization of the country, i.e. to increase spending in the defense sector in
order to reduce the likelihood of a successful conflict. Under a democratic rule,
in particular, the model is used in order to check whether a fiscal policy program
based on a redistribution of the oil wealth is able to prevent an insurrection or
whether a “factional” democracy (i.e. a regime where political groups are weak,
military role in the administration of the country is not uncommon and the “de-
velopment of clientelistic networks and rent-seeking behavior” is encouraged
by “nontransparent mechanisms of rent distribution”, [34]) can emerge.14
Simultaneously, the other N excluded agents should decide whether to start a
conflict against the government in order to provide a better distribution of the
natural resource that has been discovered.15 In particular, each of theN peasants
has to choose the coalition to join, i.e. whether to support the insurrection or to
remain neutral. As far as the revenues which derive from a successful conflict,
if they accept to join the coalition they agree to share the natural resource ex-
14An example of such a political regime is represented by Ecuador during the 1980s (see, also,
footnote 31). In this country, the importance of the military in the economy is well documented
even after 1979 (re-introduction of a democracy). In fact, despite the expansion of the electorate
a large fraction of all petroleum resources continued accrue to the military. In 1989, 14.5 percent
of all revenues were perceived by the military sector ([43], cfr. [34]).
15In the sense of the present analysis, conflict has to be intended as a set of actions, strategies,
coordination policies among agents aimed at obtaining a better redistribution of resources. The redistrib-
ution of resources may be direct or indirect, that is, for instance, through a fiscal policy aimed at providing
a non-rival public goods to the citizens.
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propriated to the losing coalition according to a fixed sharing rule ψ (see Section
1.2.3).
Finally, in the third stage rents from the sale of the natural resource accrue to
the respective owners. As it will be outlined in the next Section (Assumption
III) the unique income source of the country derives from the sale of the natural
resource to foreign agents.
The game is solved by backward induction.
1.2.2 Assumptions.
Conflict Decision
The decision by the peasants to provoke an insurrection is modelled by consid-
ering the following assumptions:
• Assumption I.1 The probability that a revolt has to succeed in the next pe-
riod is given by λ. In particular, λ depends on (1) the proportion of agents
that decide to oppose to the government (ξ = NA
N+1
) and (2) on an (exoge-
nous) parameter δ (δ1 = δ2 = . . . = δN = δ) that reflects the effort that
agents put in the protests. λ is positive for any value ξ, δ > 0, λ(0, δ) = 0. λ
is assumed to be an increasing function of both ξ and δ, i.e. ∂λ(·)
∂ξ
, ∂λ(·)
∂δ
> 0,
that is, as the percentage of groups who support the protests and effort
increase, the probability the peasants have to succeed in the protests in-
creases as well. For simplicity, it is assumed that λ = λ (ξ, δ) = ξ1/δ, where
δ ≥ 0;
• Assumption I.2 In equilibrium only two coalitions (A, B) are assumed to
form;
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• Assumption I.3 After the conflict, a fraction θ of the total natural resource
endowment of the members of the losing coalition is expropriated by the
members of the winning coalition and divided in equal parts. The increase
of natural resource endowment is assumed to be permanent;
• Assumption I.4 The whole country is interested by the civil conflict. In
addition, it is assumed that after a conflict, a fraction  of natural resource
endowments of all group participating to the conflict is destroyed;
• Assumption I.5 If a coalition wins, its members become the (new) govern-
ments’ rulers.
The decision of the peasants to enter in a row over resource redistribution
is studied in a very simple model of conflict. An individual randomly chosen in
the group of peasants (say, î) proposes to form a coalition (coalition A) and enter
in conflict against the government in order to provide a better redistribution of
the natural resource. In turn, the other agents have to decide whether to join the
coalition or to remain neutral.16, 17
If an agent decides to join a coalitionA, she agrees to share the outcome from the
expropriation of the natural resource endowment of the rival coalition and to set
a fiscal policy that is able to maximize the total post-tax income of the group. It
is supposed that entering in a conflict over government’s total resource endow-
ments under coalition A implies a binding commitment to a particular sharing
16Or, analogously, to join government’s coalition (coalition B).
17Technically, the (sub)-game under analysis can be structured as follows: each prospective
member of coalition A has to respond whether to join coalition A or remain neutral in a prede-
termined order rule. In this stage, a strategy of agent i (i 6= î = 1, 2, . . . , N ) σi is, therefore,
represented by: σi (s) ∈ {Y es, No}, where s represents the number of the persons that have
already agreed to join the coalition.
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rule ψ. In the analysis that follows, I make the simplifying assumption that
coalition members equally share the amount of natural resource endowment ex-
propriated to the rival coalition.18 On the contrary, if agent i decides not to join
rebels coalition (coalitionA) she obtains, in case of success of her coalition (coali-
tion B), a part of coalition A’s total resource endowment.
Political Regimes: Definition
In the framework under analysis, each of the major types of government is de-
fined bywho controls the government and by the economic and fiscal conditions
that best serve their interests. To the purpose of this analysis, an authoritarian
government is defined as one controlled by a specific autocrat; in particular in
these regimes requirements for voting are enhanced.
On the other hand, democratic systems are defined as “those regimes in which
governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (see, e.g.,
[45]). In particular, this model of democracy represents an indirect mechanism
of social consensus; in other words, governments are ruled according to a ma-
jority rule ([46]). The decision by autocrats to introduce such a political regime
is defined as (full) democratization of the country.19
Role of Government
As for the role of the government (agent B) in the economy, it is assumed that:
18In this analysis, for simplicity, only conflicts that may take place between the different coali-
tions are considered. However, as [44] points out, since members of a coalition have to agree on
how to distribute the resource between themselves, “within” group conflicts can also arise.
19For a definition of redistributive and military (“predatory”) authoritarian regimes, see Sec-
tion 1.2.3.
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• Assumption II.1 All resources available to the government comes from a
tax on total income, Y . It is assumed that total income derives from the
sale of the natural resource each agent owns (see also Assumption III);
• Assumption II.2 The government may decide to implement a redistribu-
tive fiscal policy by financing lump-sum transfers of income. In particular,
it is assumed that they take the form of the provision of public goods. Let
t and G denote (1) the percentage of income the worker has to pay to the
government as taxes and (2) the aggregate level of government spending
on the provision of the public good, respectively. Following [47] it is as-
sumed thatG =
(
t− t2
2
)
Y where Y is the average income of the country;20
• Assumption II.3 In order to describe the differences in tastes existing be-
tween the government and other individuals, a parameter γ (γ ∈ [0, 1]) is
introduced. In particular, this parameter allows me to account for the fact
that the public good provided to the citizens may differ from their pref-
erences. Therefore, when γ = 1, the public good matches perfectly the
preferences of the peasants. On the other hand, γ = 0 (γB = 1 − γ = 1)
implies that the public good responds to the preferences of government’s
ruler, i.e. citizens are assumed to receive less utility from the consump-
tion of the public good.21 Under assumptions II.1 to II.3, post-tax (indirect)
utility levels of peasants and ruling party are, respectively, given by:
piDi (t, γ) = (1− t) · Yi + γ ·G
20From this assumption, it follows that the collection of taxes is costly. In particular, at tax rate
t there is a deadweight cost of c(t) = t
2
2 Y .
21In other words, peasants and the ruling party may have different tastes as far as the provi-
sion of the public good is concerned. This assumption is borrowed from [48] where agents are
assumed to differ in “their tastes for the public good”.
13
piDB (t, γ) = (1− t) · YB + (1− γ) ·G
where Yi (YB) is the income level of the peasants (ruling party);
• Assumption II.4a The government can decide to spend a part β of its
income in order to grant defense from internal threats. This additional
spending by the government can be seen as a form of insurance against
political instability (see [49]);
• Assumption II.4b The probability of a revolt to succeed depends on the
effort of the opponents of the regime relative to the military strength of
government, which in turn depends on the level of defense spending (see
previous assumption). In order to leave the model simpler, military spend-
ing is assumed to accrue to individuals which are external to the country;22
• Assumption II.5 There is no discounting. The game can be defined as
static. Finally, financing is not allowed.
Income from the natural resource
The structure of the economy is modelled by assuming that:
Assumption III The natural resource is able to generate income according to
the function:
Yi = pi ·Ri i = A1, A2, . . . , AN , B
where pi is a parameter representing the ability to produce income by selling the
natural resource (and investing the oil wealth) and Ri is the amount of natural
22This is the case, for instance, when the domestic government obtains support from agents
who are external to the country.
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resources each agent is endowed with. No other income sources are available. It
is assumed that pj = pA, ∀j = A1, A2, . . . , AN . On the other hand, pB ≤ pA.
Let me denote by i ∈ A and j ∈ B (i 6= j) the members of the coalitions A
and B, respectively. The coalition structure such that NA individuals decide to
fight whereas N + 1 − NA individuals decide to support the government is de-
noted by P =
{
P = {NA, NB} |NA ∈ 2N+1, NB = N + 1−NA
}
or P = {PA, PB}.
If agent i (or j) belongs to the winning coalition, the increase in natural resource
endowment is given by:
∆RAi∈A = θ
R̂ + R̂0 (N + 1−NA)
NA
∆RBj∈B = R̂0θ
NA
N + 1−NA
On the other hand, in case of defeat, we have:
∆RQi∈Z = −R0 · [+ θ (1− )]
where Z, Q ∈ {A, B} (Z 6= Q), R̂0 = R0 · (1− ), R̂ = R · (1− ). Subscripts
denote the winning coalition.
The new level of natural resource endowment for each peasant after a conflict is
given by:
RWi∈Z = R̂0i +∆R
W
i∈Z
where ∆RWi∈Z = ∆R
Z
i∈Z (in case of success) or ∆R
Q
i∈Z (defeat).
According to Assumption I, the payoff (expected income) of individual i (i =
1, 2, . . . , N ) if she decides to enter in the conflict (where coalitionA is composed
by NA agents) can be specified as follows:
E
[
piWi∈Z(NA, δ)
]
= pi
[
ξ1/δRAi∈Z +
(
1− ξ1/δ)RBi∈Z](1.1)
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As far as agent B (government) is concerned, I have:
E
[
piWB (NA, δ)
]
= pB
[
ξ1/δRAB +
(
1− ξ1/δ)RBB](1.2)
where RAB = R̂B (1− θ) and RBB = R̂B + θ bR0·NAN+1−NA .
On the other hand, let me denote by piPi the payoff individual i receives under a
regime of peace, i.e. piPi = Yi.23
When the possibility of a military regime is introduced, the model is modified
along the lines outlined above (see assumptions II.4a and 4b). With regard to
government’s total natural resource revenues, in particular, it follows that:
piMB (β) = (1− β) [pB · (R0 +R)]
On the contrary, the expected payoff of the peasant i if she decides to enter in
the conflict under coalition A is given by:
E
[
piWi∈A(N, δ̂)
]
= pA
[
ξ1/
bδRAi +
(
1− ξ1/bδ
)
RBi
]
∀i ∈ A
where
δ̂ =
δ
1 + δg(β)
, δ′g(β) =
∂δg(β)
∂β
> 0
Without loss of generality, I assume that:
δ̂ =
δ
1 + β · k(1.3)
23It can be easily noticed that equations (1.1) and (1.2) are characterized by spillovers. In other
words, the decision by an agent to join a coalition affects the payoffs of all other agents. These
spillovers can be either positive or negative depending on the fact that the change in the payoff
associated to the increase in the likelihood of a positive result in the civil war is greater or less
than the reduction in the payoff due to the that the natural resource has to be divided among a
greater number of agents.
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where k is a positive parameter (given exogenously) that represents the relative
fighting efficiency of the governmental army with respect to the peasants one.
Equation (1.3) is derived by assuming that the military strength of the govern-
ment is a linear function of the level of defense spending.24 In other words, the
utility that arises from a successful revolt is decreasing in the level of defense
spending of the government.
1.2.3 Solution of the game
Conflict decision
In order to analyze the second stage of the game without considering the fiscal
policy implications of a (possible) regime change (that is, even if a revolution
succeeds, the equilibrium fiscal policy is represented by no taxes, no provision
of public goods), the following constraint is added to assumption I:
Assumption I.1bisWith regard to parameter θ, it is assumed that:
θ ≤ θ ≤ 1 where θ = (1− ) {[pB − pA]R0 + pBR}
[pA + pBN ]E [∆RAi (N)]
where, as it will be seen later,E
[
∆RAi (N)
]
= (1− ) {[R +R0(N + 1)]λ (N, δ)−N ·R0} /N
is the expected increase in the amount of the natural resource if the coalition
wins the conflict. λ (N, δ) =
(
N
N+1
)1/δ represents the probability that a conflict
has to succeed if all peasants decide to fight.
The equilibrium strategy by the peasants results from the following Proposition:
24This assumption borrows from [50] and implies that the model does not allow for different
productivities of military spending across political regimes.
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PROPOSITION 1. In the present model of coalition formation and conflict, the
equilibrium structure satisfies one of the following three cases:
(i) P = {PN , PB} ∈ NE(G)25 (conflict) if and only if:
δ < 1 and R > R˜ where R˜ = N ·R0 ·
[
1 +

θ (1− )
]
· [λ (N, δ)]−1 −R0 (N + 1)
(1.4)
If condition (2.12) is not satisfied, the unique Nash equilibrium coalition structure is
given by P = {P0, PN+1} ∈ NE(G) (i.e. no agent decides to fight, peace equilibrium).
(ii) On the contrary, if 1 ≤ δ ≤ δ˜ (where
δ˜ =
ln(N + 1)
ln {[θ · (1− ) · [R +R0 · (N + 1)]]} − ln {R0 · [θ · (1− ) + ]}
the coalition structure P = {P0, PN+1} (peace equilibrium) is the NE(G).
(iii) Finally, if δ > δ˜ and δ ≥ 1, there is no stable coalition structure under equilibrium.
PROOF. For a proof of this Proposition, see the Appendix.26
From the previous Proposition, it follows that, provided that the amount of
natural resources endowment is sufficiently high, a collective action by a wide
coalition of different social groups aimed at reacting to considerable distortions
in the distribution of income and oriented to affect a better redistribution of oil
rents can originate.27 Viceversa, if the increase in the natural resources endow-
ment of the government’s ruler is lower than R˜, the grand coalition where all
25Nash equilibrium of the game.
26It is assumed that, if the payoffs agents receive under the two scenarios (revolution or peace)
are the same, the equilibrium outcome is no war.
27This is the point of [8] as far as the Iran revolution is concerned (see also footnote 1).
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agents decide not to fight (peace equilibrium) represents the NE(G): the possibil-
ity of internal conflicts (or political instability) does not represent a threat for
both authoritarian and democratic systems.
According to a political economy approach to internal instability, civil conflict
is an activity which could have a low probability of success and high potential
costs. Problems due to the organization of revolts may also arise (according to
this model negative spillovers arise when δ > 1). These results are consistent
with a theory of rebel motivation ([51]) based on the argument that, despite the
presence of grievances by the population, a coalition may form only if appropri-
ate effective conditions (in the present analysis, the existence of abundant nat-
ural resources) are satisfied. Hence, groups of individuals can mount effective
revolts (aimed at a better redistribution of natural resources) only under prede-
termined conditions which could prove difficult to achieve.
From straightforward calculations it results that:
REMARK 1. R˜ (threshold value of R such that if R > R˜ all peasants have an in-
centive to fight the government) is an increasing function of R0,  and N and a
decreasing function of θ and δ.
According to the previous remark, a result that is worth noticing is that,
as the number of political groups increases, the level of the mimimum amount
of the resource endowment such that all peasants have an incentive to fight in-
creases. On the contrary, R˜ is a decreasing function of the parameter θ. Finally,
in addition, R˜ and R0 () are positively correlated. As the natural resource en-
dowment of the peasants (or the fraction of the resource that is expected to be
destroyed) increases, the level of R˜ increases as well.
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From an authoritarian regime to . . .
The different strategies that can be undertaken by the (authoritarian) govern-
ment in order to prevent revolts are here separately considered and discussed.
The first action that can be implemented is the introduction of a redistributive
fiscal policy. In order to provide a better description of the fiscal policy of the
government aimed at preventing revolution, the decisions over the fiscal policy
is assumed to embody the choice of the type of public good to provide to the
population (see assumption II). Revenues that come from the sale of natural re-
sources are employed to provide a non-rival public good to the citizens. Under
some circumstances, a process of (full) democratization is shown to be the equi-
librium outcome. In this case, according to Corollary 1.1, the tax rate and the
quality of the public good are those preferred by the country’s median income
voter. To the other extreme, if other conditions are satisfied, the commitment by
the ruling party to implement a redistributive fiscal policy is not able to prevent
an internal conflict. Consequently, a military sector emerges according to Propo-
sition 3.
Other political regimes that can emerge are redistributive authoritarian regimes.
The political group which rules the country, in order to avoid an insurrection,
may embark on important investment programs often directed at building ba-
sic infrastructure or at providing essential public services to the population. An
often cited example is that of the Persian Gulf countries which, thanks to oil rev-
enues, have been able to raise living standards of the whole population. In other
words, latent pressures for democratization are eliminated by a spending policy
carried out by the authoritarian regime.28
28This is the point of, for instance, [52] and [53] which consider the process of democratization
for Saudi Arabia and Libya, respectively. [54] documented the capacity of large oil producers
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To the purpose of the present analysis, a direct redistribution of the natural re-
sources is considered as an alternative to a redistribution of the revenues that
accrues to the government. The possibility that “paternalistic” or “reformist”
autocracies ([34]) arise is, therefore, considered by analyzing a specific feature of
the model.29
Finally, governments could decide to increase the military spending such that
the reduction in the probability of a successful protest suffices to reduce any
threats of revolution (military regime or “predatory” autocracy). Natural re-
source wealth may allow governments to spend more in order to grant internal
security. The permanence of the status quo is guaranteed by the use of natural
resources with the aim to preserve the power from internal threats. Natural re-
sources revenues are not employed in order to finance productive activities but
they are rather used as a repression instrument. Consequently, the level of rev-
enues inequality tends not to decrease.
Examples of this type of political regime are Iran during the 1970s (see [55]),
Nigeria, country which has experienced a succession of military dictatorships
([34]), Ecuador during the 1970s, as well as Angola, after oil and diamonds were
discovered (early 1990s, see, [56]). For all these countries, as a consequence of
to prevent social unrest by employing oil revenues in order to finance the provision of public
goods and services.
29Two cases will be considered: while according to the first option (our benchmark case), the
government decides to redistribute directly part of the natural resource R (see Proposition 2.2),
according to the second possibility the ruling party engages in a program of public spending
financed by using part of the income generated by the sale of the natural resource (see Corollary
2.1). Finally, Corollary 2.2 presents the condition to be satisfied in order for a program of public
spending to be the equilibrium strategy of the ruling party.
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the oil boom, military spending was increased considerably.30, 31
The following Proposition can now be proved:32
PROPOSITION 2.
2.1 Implementation of a redistributive fiscal policy. Under the assumption:
θ < θ̂ where θ̂ =
Y 2 + pA ·R0 · [pA ·R0 − 2Y · (1− )]
2 · pA · E [∆RAi (N)]Y
(1.5)
the fiscal policy implemented by the ruling government is able to prevent an insurrection
when the fiscal policy allows for a public good that responds to the preferences of the
peasants (i.e., γ∗ = 1) and for a tax rate t∗ such that:
t∗ = 1− pA ·R0 +
[
Y
(
Y − 2 · E [∆Y Wi ]− 2 · pA ·R0)+ (pAR0)2]1/2
Y
(1.6)
and
t∗ ≤ t∗B =
−E [∆Y WB ]
pB · (R0 +R)
30In Nigeria, regimes of military dictatorships employed oil rents in order to boost programs
of public capital spending. However, resources were appropriated mainly by a corrupt elite or
fuelled distorted and wasteful economic sectors ([57]). As a consequence, the general welfare of
the population did not increase.
31As for Ecuador, the prospect of vast oil reserves expected to transform country’s feable
economy was a fundamental factor in determining the military coup that overthrew president
Ibarra’s government in 1972. General Lara’s government decided to employ oil resources to
implement social policies and an economic agenda directed at modernizing agriculture and in-
troduce a program of industrial development in order to foster growth and reduce national
economy’s dependence from abroad. However, since it was not able to include the powerful
business elite into any of the governmental structures and decision-making processes, in 1976 it
was removed.
32To notice that in Sections 1.2.3 and 1.3.1, only the case δ < 1, condition that (provided that
R > R˜) ensures that a grand coalition of peasants forms under equilibrium, will be considered.
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where E
[
∆Y Wi
]
= pA
[
θ · E [∆RAi (N)]−R0] and
E
[
∆Y WB
]
= −pB
{
 (R0 +R) + θ ·N · E
[
∆RAi (N)
]}
denote the expected change in
revenues the peasants and the ruling party, respectively, have if a conflict has to start.
2.2 Case of a redistributive authoritarian regime. In order to prevent a revolu-
tion from occurring, the government’s ruler has to redistribute a fraction of the resource
endowment equal to α˜ where:
α˜ =
E
[
∆Y Wi
] ·N
R · pA(1.7)
2.3 Emergence of a “predatory” autocracy. Provided that ˜˜R ≤ R ≤ ˜˜R(2), in
order to avoid a revolution the ruling party has to spend in defense spending an amount
of resource equal to:
β˜ =
δ · [ln(ϕ)− ln(ϑ)]− ln(N + 1) + ln(N)
[ln(N + 1)− ln(N)] · k(1.8)
where ln(x) is the natural logarithm of x, ϑ = R0 · N · [+ θ · (1− )] and ϕ =
θ · (1− ) · [R +R0 · (N + 1)].
PROOF. The complete proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix.
However, here it should observed that Proposition 2 is obtained by consider-
ing whether two conditions are satisfied: 1) peasants get an increase of their
expected income with respect to the likely income under a regime of conflict; 2)
even the government’s ruler is better off relative to a situation of conflict.
Let me now extend Proposition 2.1 by considering the case of a full democ-
ratization of the country. The following corollary is argued to hold.
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COROLLARY 1.
1.1 The fiscal policy. In the case of a process of (full) democratization of the country
the fiscal policy implemented by the government implies that:
t∗ = t̂m and G∗ =
(
t̂m − bt2m2
)
Y
where t̂m = Y−pA·R0Y and Y =
pA·R0·N+pB(R0+R)
N+1
represent the tax rate preferred by me-
dian income voter (agent i) and the average income of the country, respectively. Finally,
in equilibrium, γ = γA = 1.
1.2 Case of a (full) democracy. Equilibrium. In order to prevent a revolution
from occurring, a (full) democratic system is set if and only if θ = θ̂ < 1 where θ̂ is
given in equation (1.5) (condition 1) and θ̂ ≥ θ˜ (condition 2) where
θ˜ = (R0+R)[(1−)Y−pAR0]
N ·E[∆RAi (N)]Y
(1.9)
PROOF. Corollary 1.1 derives from a direct application of the median in-
come voter’s theorem.33 For a formal proof of Corollary 1.2, refer to the Appen-
dix. Here, it is worth observing that, While condition 1 states the assumption
under which the optimal tax rate for the peasant is the equilibrium tax rate, con-
dition 2 guarantees that the post-tax income of the government’s rulers is higher
with respect to the expected post-tax income in case of conflict.
All in all, results outlined by Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 1 are summa-
rized in Table 1.1.
33See [58] for a presentation of this fundamental concept of political economy.
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[INSERT TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
If, on the one hand, the introduction of a fiscal policy characterized by a tax rate
equal to t∗ < t̂m) is a feasible possibility when θ < θ̂ and t∗ ≤ −E[∆Y
W
B ]
pB ·(R0+R) , on the
other hand, a (full) democracy may emerge when θ = θ̂ and θ̂ ≥ θ˜.
Finally, Table 1.1 shows that, under certain circumstances (and namely when: 1)
θ = θ̂ and θ̂ < θ˜, 2) θ > θ̂ or 3) θ < θ̂ and t∗ >
−E[∆YWB ]
pB ·(R0+R) ) political instability
can not be avoided: for either the peasants or the ruling party, conflict is a more
profitable option with respect to accepting a redistributive fiscal policy.
Stability of the process of democratization. The issue relative to the stabil-
ity of equilibrium under a redistributive fiscal policy can now be addressed in
more detail. Can political instability arise after the authoritarian government
redistribute oil revenues through the provision of a public good? At this regard,
the following Proposition is argued to be valid:
PROPOSITION 3.
3.1 Stability of a democratic regime. A full democracy is stable if and only if:
θ = θ̂ and θ̂ ≥ θ˜
where θ˜ and θ̂ are, respectively, given in equations (1.5) and (1.9).
3.2 Emergence of a military sector. Assuming that θ > θ̂ and k ≥ k˜ where
k˜ =
ln(N)− ln(N + 1)− δ · [ln(η)− ln(χ)]
ln(N + 1)− ln(N)(1.10)
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here χ = 2 · pA · θ · [R +R0 · (N + 1)] · (1− ) and
η = N · {tm · Y · (2− tm)− 2 · pA ·R0 · [tm − − θ · (1− )]}, the government has to
spend in military spending a fraction ˜˜β of revenues equal to:
˜˜
β =
k˜
k
where k˜ is given in equation (1.10). Another condition to be satisfied for a “factional”
democracy34 to emerge is:
˜˜
β ≤ ˜˜β(2) where˜˜
β
(2)
= δ·LW ·(1−tm)·(R+R0)−ε·k·{R0·[θ·N ·(1−)]+(R+R0)·(tm−)}
$·ε·k
here ε = ln(N +1)− ln(N), ς = (R+R0) · (1− tm+k · (− tm))−k ·θ ·n ·R0 · (1− ),
$ = (R +R0) · (1− tm) and LW = LW
(
−ε·k·θ·(1−)·[R+R0·(n+1)]·exp−ε·ς/(δ·$)
δ·(−$)
)
.35
3.3 Political instability. When k < k˜, ˜˜β > ˜˜β(2) or θ < θ˜, a regime of political
instability is the likely outcome.
PROOF.While Proposition 3.1 derives directly from Proposition 2.1, proofs
of Proposition 3.2 and 3.3 are obtained by considering the solution of the follow-
ing problem by the (democratic) government:
34For a definition of “factional” democracy see Section 1.2.1.
35LW denotes, in particular, a Lambert’s W function, i.e, a function that solves the equation
w · expw = xwhere w represents a function of x.
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Problem 2
minβE
[
piWB
(
N,
˜˜
δ
)]
− piFDB (tm, 1, β)
such that
piDi (tm, 1) < E
[
piW,Di
(
N,
˜˜
δ
)]
, ∀i = A1, A2, . . . , AN
β ∈ [0, 1] and
E
[
piWB
(
N,
˜˜
δ
)]
< piFDB (tm, 1, β)
where piFDB (tm, 1, β) = (1− β) · piDB (tm, 1) (income that the government gets
under a regime of “factional” democracy).
As a solution of Problem 2, a fraction ˜˜β of the post-tax income of the rich
group (group with the natural resource endowment) is spent in military. In par-
ticular, ˜˜β is decided in order to reduce the incentive of the peasants to undertake
protests, i.e. ˜˜β|E [piDi (·)] = E [piW,Di (·)]. The implementation of such a policy is
constrained by two orders of conditions. Firstly, cases under which the introduc-
tion of a regime of “factional” democracy is a convenient option for the ruling
party have to be determined. According to my notation, E
[
piWB (·)
]
< piFDB (·).
This condition is true when ˜˜β ≤ ˜˜β(2). On the contrary, when ˜˜β > ˜˜β(2) the mil-
itary sector is so expensive that the government does not care if political insta-
bility arises after the natural resource endowment is discovered.36 The second
constraint that should be satisfied is that β ∈ [0, 1]. In fact, financing is not al-
lowed in the present model (see Assumption II.5). This condition holds when
k ≥ k˜. This completes the proof.
36Political instability poses a limited burden on the government even when θ = θ̂ and θ̂ < θ˜.
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According to Proposition 3, under certain conditions (namely, θ = θ̂ ≥ θ˜),
the new equilibrium can be defined to be stable. On the contrary, under other
assumptions (i.e., θ > θ̂, see Table 1.1), a military sector emerges following lines
that are similar to those outlined above for a pure authoritarian regime (case of
a “factional” regime, [34]).
Finally, when significant amount of revenues accrues to governments, neither
mature nor “factional” democracies are able to emerge. In other words, democ-
racies tend to be characterized by political instability.37, 38.
Notes on the implementation of redistributive policies. If the attempt by the
government to prevent a revolution bymeans of a direct redistribution of part of
the natural resource discovered is considered, the following Corollary is shown
to hold.
COROLLARY 2.
2.1 Direct redistribution of the natural resource. In order to prevent a revolution
from occurring, (and assuming that E
[
∆Y Wi
] ·N ≤ −E [∆Y WB ]) governments’ rulers
37To notice that, in the framework under analysis, peasants may undermine democratic in-
stitutions when redistributive fiscal policies are perceived as inequal (in light of the natural re-
source rents the owner of oil endowment gets).
38An example of this situation is represented by Congo Brazzaville ([59]) during the early
1990s. In this country, because of the pressures for a better redistribution of oil revenues, democ-
racy under Lissouba proved incapable to consolidate and a civil war represented the “end of
Congo’s democratic experiment” ([60]). A military regime was able to regain control over state
(and, hence, oil) revenues. President Sassou reintegrated a form of “neo-patrimonial state” ([51])
in which resources have been deployed (in an effort to build up a political support base) through
military employment benefits, investments in the civil sector and inefficient spending programs
in education.
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have to redistribute a fraction of the income generated from the sale of the resource equal
to ˜˜α where:
˜˜α = E [∆Y Wi ] ·N
R · pB =
pA
pB
α˜(1.11)
2.2 Equilibrium strategy. A program of public spending where a fraction α˜ of
total natural resource rent is spent is a possible policy that can be implemented by the
ruling party if and only if pB is equal to pA.
A direct redistribution of the natural resource is a more profitable option relatively to a
program of public spending provided that pB < pA.
PROOF. The complete proof of Corollary 2.1 is given in the Appendix.
The equilibrium outlined by Corollary 2.2 can be derived by calculating the level
of pB such that revolution is not a profitable option for both the peasants and
the ruling party. At this regard, from Proposition 2.3 and Corollary 2.1 it fol-
lows that, if α = α˜ (or α = ˜˜α), the redistribution of a fraction of the natural
resource directly (or the implementation of a program of public spending) and
no conflict is, respectively, the NE(G). As a second step, the level of pB such that
a program of public spending is (at least) as profitable as a direct redistribution
of the natural resource has to be determined. It is straightforward to show that:
piRB(α˜) ≥ piRB(˜˜α)⇐⇒ α˜ ≤ ˜˜α
Hence, from equations (1.7) and (1.11):
α˜ ≤ ˜˜α⇐⇒ pB ≤ pA
That is, the condition for pB such that a program of public spending can be an
equilibrium outcome is given by pB = pA (see Assumption III). On the other
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hand, if pB ≤ pA the government will obtain a higher payoff if it directly redis-
tributes the natural resource. This completes the proof.
1.3 Discussion
1.3.1 Final equilibrium outcome.
While in the Section 1.2.3 the issue of the emergence of particular regimes is
solved separately, this Section concludes the analysis of the equilibrium out-
come of the game by dealing with the choice of a particular political regime by
the government’s ruler. Main determinant of the decision by the ruling party
is the objective to maximize its (expected) income. From the previous analysis,
the government has to take into account the necessity to reduce the threats of
internal conflict.
According to Proposition 2, where natural resource revenues accrue to an au-
thoritarian ruler, either a process of (full) democratization of the country or re-
distributive or “predatory” policies are likely to be implemented,
From the previous discussion, the overall equilibrium outcome in an authoritar-
ian regime will satisfy the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4. A military regime will be adopted by the ruling party if and
only if k > k∗ where:
k∗ =
{ln(N)− ln(N + 1)− δ · [ln(%)− ln(ν)]} · (R +R0)
E [∆Y Wi ] ·N · [ln(N + 1)− ln(N)]
(1.12)
where % = R0 ·N · [+ θ · (1− )] and ν = θ · (1− ) · (R +R0 · (N + 1)).
On the other hand, when k < k∗ a redistributive authoritarian regime will be adopted.
30
PROOF. Proposition 4 indicates the conditions under which the ruling
party will choose either to move to a redistributive policy or to adopt a military
authoritarian regime. The ruling party has to choose the policy that maximizes
its (expected) total revenue. In particular, the government’s ruler will decide to
adopt a military regime (redistributive autocracy) if and only if:
piMB
(
β˜
)
> (<)piRB (α˜)(1.13)
where piMB
(
β˜
)
= (1 − β˜) [pB · (R0 +R)] and piRB (α∗) = pB {R0 +R (1− α∗)} [β˜
and α∗ = α˜ (or ˜˜α) are given in equation (1.8) and (1.7) (or (1.11)), respectively].
Equation (1.13) is satisfied when k > (<)k∗ where k∗ is given in equation (1.12).
According to Proposition 3, as parameter k increases, the equilibrium response
by the authoritarian leaders will switch from redistributive policies to military
practices.
The proof is complete by considering that Proposition 4 rules out the possibility
that a democratic regime emerges. In fact, given the assumptions of the model
(see Section 1.2.2) condition piRB(α˜) > pi
D
B (t
∗) is always satisfied. In other words,
even if it is a feasible alternative (piDB (t
∗) > 0 where t∗ = t|piDi (t∗) = 0), the
introduction of a redistributive fiscal policy does not represent a first best choice.
From a technical viewpoint, a likely explanation is the possibility that, because
of the deadweight losses associated to the tax collection and provision of public
goods, inefficiencies arise from the introduction of a fiscal sector with respect to
the other two alternatives. In addition, it is worth noticing that the ruling party
receives less utility from the public good. If a mathematical point of view is
taken into account, piRB(α˜) < pi
D
B (t
∗) if and only if R ∈
(
R, R˜
)
.39 But since R > R˜
39Where: R = R0·{pA·N ·[θ·(N−λ(N, δ)·(N+1))·(1−)+N ·]−2·pB}pA·λ(N, δ)·θ·N ·(1−)+2·pB .
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(condition such that all peasants decide to fight, see Proposition 1) it follows that
piRB(α˜) > pi
D
B (t
∗) for all values of R.
1.3.2 Comparative statics.
With regard to the emergence of a redistributive or a military regime in authori-
tarian countries, evidence on the adoption of a given policy by the authoritarian
govenment, is obtained by simulating the decision process making of the au-
thoritarian leader. Results are reported in Tables 1.2 to 1.7.40
In particular, from Table 1.2 the following observations result: as the number of
(socio-political) groups increases, governments can move from military regimes
to redistributive autocracies. This is due to the fact that the higher the fragmen-
tation of a country, the lower the level of public (redistributive or military) ex-
penses to sustain. Furthermore, the reduction of redistributive expenses by the
government is higher with respect to the reduction in military spending.41 An
interesting evidence that results from Table 1.2 is that for high levels of fragmen-
tation even the introduction of a fiscal policy can be employed in order to avoid
an insurrection. However, the adoption of a redistributive policy or a military
regime is a more profitable option available to the ruling party (see Proposition
3). Finally, as seen previously (Remark 1), an increase in N has the effect to in-
crease R˜, so that in some instances,42 threat of conflict does not represent, any
longer, a feasible strategy that can implemented by the peasants.
40The payoff of the optimal strategy for the ruling party is reported in bold letters.
41Remember that, while the military spending of a country affects the total income of the
ruling party only indirectly (i.e. in a probabilistic way), the redistribution of income represents
a direct disincentive to the conflict.
42For example, for N = 7 in the simulation exercise.
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[INSERT TABLE 1.2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1.3 shows how the response of the government changes as the endow-
ment of the natural resource which is discovered increases. Results suggest that
natural resources poor-countries will tend to adopt military regimes. However,
as the amount of the natural resource increases, the authoritarian leader will be
better off by introducing redistributive autocracy regime. This is the case of, for
instance, Saudi Arabia, by definition the classic “rentier state” ([61]). Because of
its huge oil reserves (approximately, 25 percent of world’s proven oil reserves),
this country was able to establish an important welfare state. The possibility
to employ natural resources revenues in order to finance investment programs
and, contemporaneously, reduce the level of taxation enables this country to
avoid extensions of political rights to large shares of the population (such as
representiveness in institutions).
Other important conclusions that arise from Table 1.3 are: 1) as R increases, the
equilibrium level of α˜ increases as well; 2) for relatively low values of R the in-
troduction of a democratic regime is also a feasible alternative (even though not
a first best choice).
[INSERT TABLE 1.3 ABOUT HERE]
Another evidence of the model is that, as θ increases (see Table 1.4), the likely
response strategies of the ruling party shifts from the adoption of redistributive
to “predatory” policies. In addition, notice that redistributive fiscal policies are
possible strategies only for low values of θ. Furthermore, Table 1.5 shows how
the equilibrium strategy changes as the level of parameter δ changes. According
to this model, as the effort each agent puts in the protest increases, the incentive
by the ruling party to undertake redistributive policies increases as well.
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With regard to the change in the percentage that is destroyed after a conflict,
Table 1.6 suggests that, the more violent the conflict, the more likely is the gov-
ernment to implement redistributive policies. Finally, as the efficiency of the
military effort (represented by the parameter k) by the ruling party increases,
the incentive to redistribute part of the resource (income) to the peasants de-
creases (Table 1.7).
[INSERT TABLES 1.4 TO 1.7 ABOUT HERE]
How are results from the theoretical model consistent with data provided by
widely acknowledged institutions? Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the main rela-
tionships of interest described by the theoretical model.43
In Figure 1.1 the relationship between the military/government final consump-
tion ratio44 and the log of population (or the crude oil production) is examined
by controlling for different ranges of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF)
index.45, 46 Even in this case, as the theoretical model correctly predicts (Table
1.2), as the level of fractionalization increases, the incentive to implement redis-
tributive policies increases as well: ceteris paribus the average ratio of military ex-
43These figures have been obtained by employing data for 27 countries (Algeria, Angola,
Azerbaijan, Cameroon, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam) over the 1988-2002 sample. Results
do not change if, for relevant variables, averages on ten-year periods are considered.
44Source of data: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2007.
45AHerfindahl-based index defined as: ELF = 1−∑i s2i (here, si is the share of group i over
the total of the population) is, in particular, employed in order to represent the probability that
two persons which are selected randomly from a given country will belong to different social
groups (see [62]).
46Countries are classified as either high or low fractionalized according to their value of the
ELF index (higher or less than 0.5) (Source: [63]).
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penditure to total government consumption expenses will tend to be higher for
low social fragmented (solid line) relative to high-fragmented countries (dashed
line).
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
Finally, Figure 1.2 illustrates the validity of another property of the theoretical
model: as oil endowments increase, the implementation of redistributive poli-
cies is preferred to military expenditure programs.47, 48 In average small oil ex-
porting countries (solid line) are more likely to have a higher military spend-
ing/government final consumption ratio with respect to large oil producers
(dashed line).
[INSERT FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE]
1.3.3 Implications for economic development
According to common wisdom, mature democracies (such as Norway) have
been able to afford the socio-economic issues raised by oil booms. In these
countries, stable party systems, high degrees of social consensus, competent and
well-functioning bureaucracies and a good rule of law have all allowed policy
stability and transparency. Consequently, high levels of competitiveness as well
47Countries are classified as small or large producers depending on the fact that their annual
production is less or more than 1 million barrels per day (bpd, Source: U.S. Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration).
48Figure 1.2 plots the ratio of military to government final consumption expenditure on the
level of population (and on the fractionalization index) by accounting for the relative size of
crude oil production.
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as policies aimed at economic stabilization have been introduced.
Other political systems that have been argued to perform well in facing socio-
economic pressures associated to oil booms are reformist autocracies. By em-
ploying natural resource revenues in productive investments aimed at diver-
sifying the economic activities of these countries, reformist autocracies have
been able to foster economic development. In addition, political stability to-
gether with stabilization and fiscal restraint measures implemented by techno-
cratic elites have been associated to good economic performances (see [64] for
an analysis of reforms in Indonesia).
Indonesia during the Suharto period is an interesting case study of the emer-
gence of a reformist political regime. The agricultural sector was protected in
an efficient way, while an attempt was made to reduce the role of the oil sector
in the economy. Finally, an equilibrated budget law was introduced to avoid
expansions of unproductive programs of social spending ([10]).
On the contrary, bad economic performances are usually associated to “fac-
tional” democracies or paternalistic autocracies. In fact, in these political regimes
public expenditure is often directed towards protected and low inefficient eco-
nomic sectors (often, public enterprises). As already outlined, examples of pa-
ternalistic autocracies are given by the Persian Gulf monarchies. For these coun-
tries, a large share of the rents from oil exports was allocated in order to raise
population’s standard livings. Consequently, programs of public spending aimed
at raising the education and health levels of the population were implemented.
However, while massive programs of investments in infrastructure were under-
taken, they were quite inefficient. Since the quality of the services remained low,
a significant self-sustained economic growth of the private sector was not able
to start.
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Finally, “predatory” autocracies have not been socially committed to economic
development. As pointed out by [64], while between 1950 and the late 1990s,
Indonesia has been able to manage well oil resources, during the same period,
Nigeria’s ruling elite had no similar concern about economic liberalization and
poverty reduction.
Other countries where military regimes have not been able to introduce a sig-
nificant process of economic development despite important oil revenues are
Syria and Angola. In the former country, primary oil production started in 1967
(Source: Syrian Petroleum Company). Revenues from the sale of the natural
resource were employed in order to enhance government autonomy from the
other social classes. A large fraction of government revenues from aid and oil
rent was absorbed by military and military-related activities. The large coalition
that formed between the ruling Baath party, the army and the bureacracy had
the effect to confine the productive industrial bourgeoisie ([65]) to the periphery
of the society with detrimental economic effects.
Angola represents another example of how in a relatively small and rich oil ex-
porter, state revenues have been redistributed in a clientelist way. In particular,
a large fraction of oil rents (in 1999, 41 percent of total government expenditure
accrued to the military sector, [56]) has been employed in order to serve security
interests or to “sustain a clientele beyond the military apparatus, building a de-
gree of legitimacy among those rewarded and allowing support or resistance to
reforms, according to a short-term expediency”.49
49However, it should be noted that, following robust stabilization policies aimed, inter alia at
reducing the inflation rate (see, for instance, [66]) Angola has recently recorded very high levels
of economic growth.
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1.4 Concluding remarks
Does natural resources (and oil, in particular) affect the process of political tran-
sition of authoritarian regimes? Why do either paternalistic or “predatory”
regimes often emerge? In this paper, a simple game-theoretical model aimed
at assessing the impact of natural resource discoveries on the set-up of a partic-
ular political regime has been introduced. The possibility that a coalition forms
in order to allow for a better redistribution of the natural resource is argued to
be the main channel through which natural resources affects political regimes
changes. This analysis relies on the conclusions by [1], [2] and [4] (among oth-
ers) according to which natural resource wealth has a positive impact on civil
war. Consequently, the study focuses on the relationships between natural re-
sources and the emergence of different political systems. The channel by means
of which oil affect the transition towards a particular regime I have focused on
is the so-called rentier effect, i.e. wealth from the exploitation of natural resources
is used in order to reduce threats of internal conflict.
A first result that emerges from this study is that the commitment by a demo-
cratic government to employ the natural resource revenues by means of a re-
distributive fiscal policy can not be able to avoid political instability. This result
is consistent with the analyses by [38], according to which “in societies where
a large fraction of GDP is generated from natural resources - democracies may
be harder to consolidate”, and [34] which, similarly, argue that, in oil exporting
countries, the emergence of a “factional” democracy is a possible outcome.
Another point stressed by this work is that, as revenues from the sale of nat-
ural resources accrues to authoritarian governments, political leaders are better
off (rather than by introducing a fiscal sector) by implementing a redistributive
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program or by introducing a military regime. The likely explanation is the hope
for the ruling party to gain “legitimacy” ([61]). Evidence is, therefore, consistent
with the existence of a positive and strongly statistically significant relationship
between the wealth from natural resources and the “tenure of leaders” (see [67].
In other words, my point of view is that, provided that some conditions are sat-
isfied, a process of (full) democratization may occur. However, as this political
transition proves not to represent a first best choice, incumbent authoritarian
rulers may prefer to maintain support by deploying natural resources rents in
order to consolidate their political power through either a redistributive policy
or adopting a military regime (see, also, [9] and [34]).
Finally, according to the result of the theoretical model it follows that the choice
between implementing redistributive or “predatory” activities depends on fac-
tors such as the size of the natural resource endowment, the number of political
groups that compose the country and on parameters that describe the technol-
ogy of warfare. While more fragmented countries - as well as countries with
higher natural resources endowments - will tend to implement redistributive
policies, low-fragmented countries - and resource-poor nations - will tend to
adopt military regimes. In addition, as the level of heterogeneity that exists
among the different groups increases, the possibility that the ruling party will
implement “predatory” autocracies increases as well. Evidence from data analy-
sis seems to confirm all the conclusions drawn on the basis of the theoretical
model.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Implementation of redistributive fiscal policies by natural-resource
rich countries, overall results
Case Value of parameter θ Fiscal Policy Conflict Final outcome
1 θ < θ̂ and t∗ ≤ −E[∆Y
W
B ]
pB ·(R0+R) tax rate=t
∗ < t̂m No redistributive fiscal policy;
2 θ ≡ θ̂ and θ̂ ≥ θ˜ tax rate=t̂m No Full democratization;
3 θ ≡ θ̂ and θ̂ < θ˜ — Yes Political instability;
4 θ < θ̂ and t∗ >
−E[∆YWB ]
pB ·(R0+R) — Yes Political instability;
5 θ > θ̂ — Yes Political instability.
Table 1.2: Simulation results (δ = 0.99, R0=3, R=21, =0.33, θ=0.51, pB=0.3, pA =
1, k=12).
N θ R˜ θ̂ t∗ t∗B β˜
˜˜
R
˜˜
R
(2)
α˜ (˜˜α) α˜B
2 0.38 8.76 0.26 — 0.53 0.11 0.48 2.41e+003 0.13 0.60
3 0.42 11.66 0.32 — 0.55 0.10 0.41 761.4 0.11 0.63
4 0.46 14.55 0.39 — 0.57 0.07 -0.06 426.8 0.08 0.65
5 0.48 17.45 0.45 — 0.58 0.04 -0.71 305.1 0.05 0.66
6 0.50 20.34 0.52 0.07 0.59 0.01 -1.41 246.9 0.01 0.67
7 0.50 23.24 — — — — — — — —
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N piPi pi
P
B E
[
piWi (·)
]
E
[
piWB (·)
]
piDA (t
∗, 1) piDB (t
∗, 1) piMB (β˜) pi
R
i (α˜) pi
R
B(α˜)
2 3.00 7.20 4.39 3.40 — — 6.43 4.39 6.37
3 3.00 7.20 3.80 3.22 — — 6.51 3.80 6.48
4 3.00 7.20 3.44 3.11 — — 6.67 3.44 6.67
5 3.00 7.20 3.20 3.04 — — 6.89 3.20 6.89
6 3.00 7.20 3.03 2.99 3.03 6.72 7.14 3.03 7.14
7 3.00 7.20 — — — — — — —
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Table 1.3: Simulation results (δ = 0.99, R0=3, N=4, =0.33, θ=0.51, pB=0.3, pA=1,
k=12).
R θ R˜ θ̂ t∗ t∗B β˜
˜˜
R
˜˜
R
(2)
α˜ (˜˜α) α˜B
14.56 0.36 14.55 0.53 0.001 0.56 8.84e-005 -1.63 426.8 1.32e-004 0.47
18.20 0.42 14.55 0.43 — 0.56 0.04 -0.76 426.8 0.05 0.45
21.84 0.47 14.55 0.37 — 0.57 0.08 0.16 426.8 0.09 0.44
25.48 0.50 14.55 0.33 — 0.57 0.11 1.14 426.8 0.12 0.44
R piPi pi
P
B E
[
piWi (·)
]
E
[
piWB (·)
]
piDA (t
∗, 1) piDB (t
∗, 1) piMB (β˜) pi
R
i (α˜) pi
R
B(α˜)
14.56 3.00 5.27 3.00 2.34 3.00 5.26 5.27 3.00 5.27
18.20 3.00 6.36 3.25 2.77 — — 6.09 3.25 6.06
21.84 3.00 7.45 3.50 3.21 — — 6.84 3.50 6.86
25.48 3.00 8.54 3.75 3.64 — — 7.55 3.75 7.65
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Table 1.4: Simulation results (δ = 0.99, R0=3, N=6, =0.33, R=21, pB=0.3, pA=1,
k=12).
θ θ R˜ θ̂ t∗ t∗B β˜
˜˜
R
˜˜
R
(2)
α˜ (˜˜α) α˜B
0.50 0.50 20.65 0.52 0.03 0.58 0.00 -1.50 248.8 0.00 0.43
0.53 0.50 19.47 0.52 — 0.60 0.02 -1.14 241.2 0.02 0.43
0.56 0.50 18.42 0.52 — 0.61 0.03 -0.77 234.4 0.04 0.43
0.59 0.50 17.48 0.52 — 0.63 0.05 -0.40 228.3 0.06 0.43
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θ piPi pi
P
B E
[
piWi (·)
]
E
[
piWB (·)
]
piDA (t
∗, 1) piDB (t
∗, 1) piMB (β˜) pi
R
i (α˜) pi
R
B(α˜)
0.50 3.00 7.20 3.02 3.01 3.02 6.98 7.17 3.02 7.17
0.53 3.00 7.20 3.08 2.90 — — 7.06 3.08 7.06
0.56 3.00 7.20 3.14 2.79 — — 6.96 3.14 6.95
0.59 3.00 7.20 3.20 2.68 — — 6.86 3.20 6.84
Table 1.5: Simulation results (θ=0.51, R0=3, N=4, =0.33, R=21, pB=0.3, pA=1,
k=12).
δ θ R˜ θ̂ t∗ t∗B β˜
˜˜
R
˜˜
R
(2)
α˜ (˜˜α) α˜B
0.85 0.49 15.67 0.41 — 0.55 0.05 -0.19 700.9 0.07 0.44
0.95 0.46 14.83 0.39 — 0.56 0.07 -0.10 484.9 0.08 0.44
1.05 0.45 14.17 0.38 — 0.57 0.08 -0.00 358.7 0.09 0.45
1.15 0.43 13.64 0.37 — 0.58 0.10 0.10 278.9 0.10 0.45
δ piPi pi
P
B E
[
piWi (·)
]
E
[
piWB (·)
]
piDA (t
∗, 1) piDB (t
∗, 1) piMB (β˜) pi
R
i (α˜) pi
R
B(α˜)
0.85 3.00 7.20 3.35 3.22 — — 6.83 3.35 6.77
0.95 3.00 7.20 3.42 3.14 — — 6.72 3.41 6.70
1.05 3.00 7.20 3.47 3.07 — — 6.61 3.47 6.63
1.15 3.00 7.20 3.52 3.01 — — 6.49 3.52 6.58
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Table 1.6: Simulation results (δ = 0.99, R0=3, N=4, R=0.21, θ=0.51, pB=0.3, pA=1,
k=12).
 θ R˜ θ̂ t∗ t∗B β˜
˜˜
R
˜˜
R
(2)
α˜ (˜˜α) α˜B
0.28 0.46 11.53 0.31 — 0.54 0.11 1.73 381.6 0.13 0.39
0.31 0.46 13.50 0.36 — 0.56 0.09 0.45 411.0 0.10 0.43
0.35 0.46 15.66 0.41 — 0.58 0.06 -0.51 443.4 0.06 0.46
0.38 0.46 18.06 0.47 — 0.60 0.03 -1.25 479.3 0.04 0.50
 piPi pi
P
B E
[
piWi (·)
]
E
[
piWB (·)
]
piDA (t
∗, 1) piDB (t
∗, 1) piMB (β˜) pi
R
i (α˜) pi
R
B(α˜)
0.28 3.00 7.20 3.69 3.34 — — 6.39 3.69 6.37
0.31 3.00 7.20 3.52 3.18 — — 6.58 3.52 6.57
0.35 3.00 7.20 3.35 3.03 — — 6.77 3.35 6.77
0.38 3.00 7.20 3.19 2.88 — — 6.97 3.19 6.98
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Table 1.7: Simulation results (δ = 0.99, R0=3, N=4, R=0.21, θ=0.51, pB=0.3, pA=1,
=0.33).
k θ R˜ θ̂ t∗ t∗B β˜
˜˜
R
˜˜
R
(2)
α˜ (˜˜α) α˜B
10.20 0.46 14.55 0.39 — 0.57 0.09 0.02 279.5 0.08 0.45
11.40 0.46 14.55 0.39 — 0.57 0.08 -0.04 371.0 0.08 0.45
12.60 0.46 14.55 0.39 — 0.57 0.07 -0.08 490.8 0.08 0.45
13.80 0.46 14.55 0.39 — 0.57 0.06 -0.12 647.9 0.08 0.45
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k piPi pi
P
B E
[
piWi (·)
]
E
[
piWB (·)
]
piDA (t
∗, 1) piDB (t
∗, 1) piMB (β˜) pi
R
i (α˜) pi
R
B(α˜)
10.20 3.00 7.20 3.44 3.11 — — 6.58 3.44 6.67
11.40 3.00 7.20 3.44 3.11 — — 6.65 3.44 6.67
12.60 3.00 7.20 3.44 3.11 — — 6.70 3.44 6.67
13.80 3.00 7.20 3.44 3.11 — — 6.74 3.44 6.67
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Figure 1.1: Oil production and emergence of a redistributive or military auto-
cratic regime. Social fractionalization
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Figure 1.2: Oil production and emergence of a redistributive or military auto-
cratic regime. Crude Oil Production
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Appendix to Chapter 1. Proof of Propositions 1 and 2,
Corollaries 1.2 and 2.1
Proof of Proposition 1
From a formal point of view, the proof of Proposition 1 relies on the following
theorem (see [68], [69], [70], [71] and [72]):
Theorem. Existence of the Nash Equilibrium.
If the payoff function of the agents satisfies the anonimity aswell as themonotonic-
ity and the single crossing properties, then, the set of the Nash equilibrium struc-
tures of the game G (NE(G)) is nonempty (NE(G)6= ∅).50
This theorem refers to stability concepts associated to individual agents de-
viations. Strictly speaking, if (1) an agent’s incentive to switch unilaterally from
a coalition to another one is related only to the size of the two coalitions (it does
not depend on agents’ identities), (2) this incentive is amonotonic function of the
number of members of a coalition and (3) it is possible to determine critical val-
ues of some parameters (say µ̂, “intensity of preference” for that coalition) such
that the incentive to switch uniterally from one coalition to the other depends
on these parameters, then, there exists at least a (Nash equilibrium) coalition
structure in the game such that individual deviations are never profitable.
50In addition, the validity of these conditions guarantees that even the set of Coalition-Proof
Nash Equilibria (CPNE(G)) is nonempty (CPNE(G)6= ∅) ([68]).
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Characterization of the equilibrium.
In order to characterize the NE(G), let me consider the differences in payoffs an
agent will get by joining a different coalition. Let me denote by E
[
piAi (k)
]
=
piAi (k) the expected payoff a representative peasant (say, i) gets if she joins coali-
tion A, coalition which is composed by k agents. In particular, let me consider
the change of the expected income agent i obtains if she decides to fight when
the number of coalition Amembers increase from k − 1 to k. The conditions un-
der which piAi (k) ≥ piAi (k − 1) have to be determined. Then, three possible cases
arise:
1. Provided that δ < 1 the fact that an agent joins the coalition has a posi-
tive effects on other agents’ expected payoffs (case of positive spillovers).
Therefore, positive externalities arise if the members of the fighting coali-
tion increases. Since:
piAi (0) ≤ . . . ≤ piAi (k − 1) ≤ piAi (k) ≤ piAi (k + 1) ≤ . . . ≤ piAi (N)
the grand coalition will form when the difference in the expected income
with respect to the status quo are positive. However, for a revolution to be
convenient, condition (2.12) should hold: when R ≤ R˜ where R˜ is given
in equation (2.12), the NE(G) is given by the partition {PN , PB}. On the
contrary, provided that condition (2.12) is not satisfied (such that piAi (N) ≤
W Pi , ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N ) the grand coalition where all N peasants decide not
to fight represents the final outcome of the game (peace equilibrium).51
51The proof of this part of Proposition 1 derives also from the definitions of superadditive and
convex games. As argued, for instance, by [73], if a game is convex and, hence, superadditive,
the grand coalition emerges in equilibrium.
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Finally, it is easy to check that the fact that individuals have no incentive
to leave the coalition once it has been decided to start a revolt implies that
the coalition is stable.
2. On the contrary, if it is assumed that 1 ≤ δ ≤ δ˜ where
δ˜ =
ln(N + 1)
ln {[θ · (1− ) · [R +R0 · (N + 1)]]} − ln {R0 · [θ · (1− ) + ]}
it follows that:
piAi (0) > pi
A
i (1) . . . > pi
A
i (k − 1) > piAi (k) > piAi (k + 1) > . . . > piAi (N)
In other words, the decision by an agent to join coalition A does not have
the effect to raise other agents’ expected payoff, i.e. the increase of the
probability of a successful revolution is not able to compensate the reduc-
tion of the expected payoff due to the necessity to divide the natural re-
source expropriated among a higher number of individuals. Therefore, un-
der assumption I.2, the alternative to join coalition B is taken into account.
In addition, since it can be proved that E
[
piAi (k)
]
< Y Pi , for k = 1, . . . , N it
follows that the status quo (no conflict) is the NE(G);
3. Finally, under the assumption that δ > δ˜ and δ ≥ 1, although negative
spillovers continue to arise from the decision of an excluded individual to
join coalition A, since piAi (0) < pi
A
i (1), themonotonicity property is no longer
valid. Hence, according to the theorem outlined above, there do not exist
any (Nash) equilibria in the game that guarantee that deviations by single
individuals are never profitable.
These observations complete the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1
The problem that the government has to face can be expressed as follows:52
Problem A.1
maxt,γpi
D
B (t, γ)
such that
E
[
piWi (N, δ)
] ≤ piDi (t, γ) , ∀i = A1, A2, . . . , AN
E
[
piWB (N, δ)
] ≤ piDB (t, γ) ,
t ∈ [0, 1](1.14)
where E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]
= R̂0 + θ · E
[
∆RAi (N)
]
(E
[
∆RAi (N)
]
= (1− ) {[R +R0(N + 1)]λ (N, δ)−N ·R0} /N and λ (N, δ) =(
N
N+1
)1/δ, i = A1, A2, . . . , AN ), piDi (t, γ) = (1− t) pA·R0+γ·(t− t22 )Y ,E [piWB (N, δ)] =
pB
{(
R̂0 + R̂
)
− θ ·N · E [∆RAi (N)]} (Y = pAR0·N+pB(R0+R)N+1 ) and
piDB (t, γ) = (1− t) pB (R0 +R) + (1− γ) ·
(
t− t2
2
)
Y .
That is, governments have to maximize the post-tax income after the introduc-
tion of a fiscal policy (defined by means of the parameters t and γ) under the
constraint that all peasants are better off in case of a redistributive fiscal policy.
The Lagrangean function associated to the problem A.1 can be specified as fol-
lows:
L˜(t, γ) = L(t, γ) + µ1t+ µ2γ
L(t, γ) = piDB (t, γ)− λ̂1
[
E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]− piDi (t, γ)]+
−λ̂2 (t− 1)(1.15)
52As outlined in the text, I focus on the case δ < 1, condition that (ensured that R > R˜)
guarantees the formation of a grand coalition.
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The solution to problem A.1 satisfies the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
(necessary and sufficient) optimality conditions:
∂L
∂t
= −µ1 ≤ 0, t ≥ 0, t∂L
∂t
= 0;
∂L
∂γ
= −µ2 ≤ 0, γ ≥ 0, γ ∂L
∂γ
= 0;
∂L
∂λ̂i
≥ 0, λ̂i ≥ 0, λ̂i ∂L
∂λ̂i
= 0
here λ̂i (i = 1, 2), µ1 and µ2 are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the
inequality constraints of problem A.1 (see equation 1.20) and the Lagrangean
function L is given by equation (1.15).
L(t, γ) = (1− γ)Y · t2
2
− {(1− γ)Y − pB (R0 +R)} · t+ E
[
Y WB
]
+
−λ̂1
{[
γY
2
] · t2 − [γY − pAR0] t+ E [Y Wi ]}+
−λ̂2 (t− 1)(1.16)
These conditions imply that:
∂L
∂t
= (1− γ) · Y · t− (1− γ) · Y + pB (R0 +R) +
+λ̂1 · (γ · Y (1− t)− pAR0)− λ̂2 ≤ 0, t ≥ 0 t∂L∂t = 0
∂L
∂γ
= Y · t (1− 1/2 · t) + λ̂1 · [Y · t (1− 1/2t)] ≤ 0,
γ ≥ 0 γ ∂L
∂γ
= 0
∂L
∂λ1
= −1/2 · γ · Y · t2 + (γ · Y − pAR0) · t− E
[
Y Wi
] ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0 λ1 ∂L
∂λ1
= 0
∂L
∂λ2
= 1− t ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0 λ2 ∂L
∂λ2
= 0
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By solving this optimization problem by following an intuitive reasoning, I
obtain as a first result that the optimal fiscal policy set by the government implies
that:
γ∗ = 1
in fact, as γ∗ decreases, the government has to increase the redistribution of in-
come aimed at leaving the peasant indifferent between fighting and working. If
the post-tax income of the ruling party is compared under the two alternatives:
1) γ∗1 = 1, t∗1 and 2) γ∗2 < 1, t∗2 > t∗1) it can be observed that, for any values of γ∗2 ,
her income is lower with respect to the case where γ∗ = 1.
By means of simple substitution, the equilibrium tax rate can be determined:
t∗ = 1− pAR0 +
[
Y
(
Y − 2 · E [Y Wi ]− 2 · pA ·R0)+ (pAR0)2]1/2
Y
(1.17)
Let me now derive the conditions under which fiscal policy is not able to
prevent a revolution. Conditions under which piDi (t, γ) < E
[
piWi (N, δ)
] ∀t ∈
[0, 1] (i.e., the expected income from insurrection is higher with respect to the
post-tax income in case of the country’s democratization is satisfied for all values
of the tax rate) have to be determined:
piDi (t, γ) < E
[
piWi (N, δ)
] ∀t⇐⇒
−{γY
2
} · t∗2 + {γY − pAR0} t∗ − E [Y Wi ] ≤ 0(1.18)
where γ = 1 and t∗ represents the tax rate for which equation (1.18) is maximized
(i.e., t∗ = Y−pAR0
Y
).53 By substituting E
[
Y Wi
]
in equation (1.18) and solving for θ,
it follows:
θ̂ = Y
2+pAR0·[pA·R0−2Y ·(1−)]
2·pAE[∆RAi (N)]Y
53Remember that piDi (t, γ)− E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]
is a concave function of t that has its maximum at
t∗ = tm = Y−pAR0Y .
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the threshold level of θ such that, if θ > θ̂, joining coalition A and starting a
conflict is always the best strategy for each peasant.
A last condition to check is that, when t = t∗, the difference between the total
income of ruling party in case of peace (after redistributive fiscal policy at tax
rate t∗) and the expected payoff in case of conflict is positive, i.e.:
piDB (t, γ) ≥ E
[
piWB (N, δ)
]⇐⇒
−γBY · t
∗2
2
+ {γBY − pB (R0 +R)} · t∗ − E
[
Y WB
] ≥ 0
where γB = 1−γ = 0,E
[
Y WB
]
= −pB
{
 (R0 +R) + θ · R̂0 ·N − θλ (N, δ) ·
[
R̂0 · (N + 1) + R̂
]}
or:
piDB (t
∗, 1)− E [piWB (N, δ)] = −pB · (R0 +R) · t∗ − E [Y WB ](1.19)
where t∗ is given in equation (1.17).
By solving equation (1.19) for t∗ it follows:
piDB (t, γ) ≥ E
[
piWB (N, δ)
]⇐⇒ t∗ ≤ t∗B = −E [Y WB ]pB · (R0 +R)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
The problem the government has to face is the following:
Problem A.2
maxαpi
R
B (α)
such that
E
[
piWi (N, δ)
] ≤ piRi (α) , ∀i = A1, A2, . . . , AN
α ∈ [0, 1] and
E
[
piWB (N, δ)
] ≤ piRB (α)
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Even in this case, the expected payoff from insurrection an agent gets when all
peasant individuals decide to join coalitionA, E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]
has to be compared
with the income a peasant obtains in case of a redistribution of the natural re-
source among citizens, piRi (α).
A second condition to check is the following:
α∗A = α˜ ≤ α∗B
where α∗B is the maximum percentage of the natural resource that has to be dis-
tributed to the peasants such that piRB (α) > E
[
piWB (N, δ)
]
. That means that, for
the authoritarian regime, the reduction of total income due to the redistribution
of natural resource among citizens is less than the reduction of expected income
she obtains in the case the peasants decide to fight. Let me consider the possibil-
ity of a direct redistribution of the natural resource among citizens. The expected
payoff from insurrection an agent gets when all peasants decide to join coalition
A is concerned and the income that a peasant obtains in case of a redistribution
of the natural resource among citizens are, respectively, given by:
E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]
= R̂0 + θ · E
[
∆RAi (N)
]
piRi (α) = pA
(
R0 +
αR
N
)
Hence, the condition under which the redistribution policy implemented
by democratic regime is able to prevent an insurrection is the following:
piRi (α) ≥ E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]⇐⇒
R̂0 + θ · E
[
∆RAi (N)
] ≤ R0 + αRN
piRi (α) ≥ E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]⇐⇒ α ≥ α˜
where α˜ =
E[YWi ]·N
R·pA
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As a second step, I have to prove that, after the redistribution of a fraction
α˜ of the natural resource, even the total income of the ruling party is higher with
respect to the expected payoff it gets in case of revolts.
In particular, the expected payoff from insurrection the government gets when
all peasants decide to join coalition A, i.e.:
E
[
piWB (N, δ)
]
= pB
{(
R̂0 + R̂
)
− θ ·N · E [∆RAi (N)]}
has to compared with the net income the government gets after redistributing
the natural resource, i.e.:
piRB(α) = pB {R0 +R · (1− α)}
Therefore, the ruling party is better off after a redistributive policy provided
that:
E
[
piWB (N, δ)
] ≤ piRB(α)⇐⇒(
R̂0 + R̂
)
− θ ·N · E [∆RAi (N)] ≤ (R0 +R)−R · α
E
[
piWB (N, δ)
] ≤ piRB(α)⇐⇒ α ≥ α˜B
where α˜B =
(R0+R)+θ·N ·E[∆RAi (N)]
R
As the inequality α˜B < α˜ is satisfied for all R > 0.54, it can be concluded that the
equilibrium fraction of the natural resource endowment to redistribute should
be equal to α˜.
54In fact, α˜ > α˜B if and only if R > −R0 · (N +1) and R < 0, but this is not possible under the
assumption of strictly positive parameters.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3
The problem the ruling party has to face is now given by: Problem A.3
minβE
[
piWB
(
N, δ̂
)]
− piMB (β)
such that
E
[
piWi
(
N, δ̂
)]
≤ piPi , ∀i = A1, A2, . . . , AN
E
[
piWB
(
N, δ̂
)]
≤ piMB (β) ,
β ∈ [0, 1]
where:
piMB = (1− β) · pB (R0 +R)
This problem can be solved by considering that the aim of governments’
rulers is to reduce the incentive compatibility of all agents to start a conflict by
spending the minimum amount β in the process of militarization of the country.
This condition holds when β corresponds to the quantity β˜ where β˜ satisfies
E
[
∆Y Wi
] (
δ̂
)
= 0. Accordingly, if we denote by R˜(2) the threshold value of the
resource endowment such that if R > R˜(2) peasants can decide to start a conflict
despite the military spending by the government, condition R ≤ R˜(2) should
hold.
Another assumption that has to be satisfied is that total income after military
spending is higher with respect to the expected payoff that derives to the gov-
ernment from a civil conflict. This is true when:
piMB (β) ≥ E
[
piWB (N, δ̂)
]
⇐⇒ R ≥ ˜˜R where ˜˜R = R0·{eβ−−θ(1−)[λ(N, bδ)·(N+1)−N]}
(1−)·θ·λ(N, bδ)+−eβ
where
(
λ
(
N, δ̂
)
=
(
N
N+1
)1/bδ) and E [piWB (N, δ̂)] are obtained by replacing in
equation (1.2) NA with N and δ with δ̂.
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Finally, extreme cases arise when the government is not able to prevent a revo-
lution even if the total amount of natural resource revenues is spent in order to
militarize the country. This is the case when condition:
R ≥ ˜˜R(2) where ˜˜R(2) = NR0 · [1 + 
θ (1− )
]
· [λ (N, δ/(1 + k))]−1 −R0 (N + 1)
(1.20)
is satisfied.55 Even in the hypothetical case where all government’s income is
spent in order to defend the country from internal threats (i.e. β = 1), the reduc-
tion of the expected income is not sufficient to prevent all peasants from starting
a conflict. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1.2
Starting point is to consider the equilibrium tax rate t∗ (see Proposition 2.1, equa-
tion 1.6) and the fiscal policy that maximizes median voter’s post-tax income
(see Corollary 1.1). The fiscal policy set is equivalent to that of a (full) demo-
cratic regime when θ = θ̂ (condition 1)where
θ̂ = Y
2+pA·R0·[pA·R0−2Y ·(1−)]
2·pAE[∆RAi (N)]Y
and θ̂ is θ such that piDi (t, 1) = E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]
(see proof of Proposition 2.1).56
In order for democracy to be achieved, a condition that has to be satisfied is that,
55For a mathematical derivation of equation (1.20) it suffices to replace β = 1 in equation (1.3)
and, then, consider equation (2.12).
56If θ < θ̂ it follows that t∗ ≤ tm. On the other hand, if θ > θ̂ the peasants will be better off if
they decide to form a coalition and enter in a conflict over resource redistribution.
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when θ = θ̂, piDB (t
∗, γ) ≥ E [piWB (N, δ)]. This condition holds when:
piDB (t, γ) ≥ E
[
piWB (N, δ)
]⇐⇒
{−pB (R0 +R)} ·
(
Y−pA·R0
Y
)− E [Y WB ] ≥ 0
where t∗ = Y−pA·R0
Y
. This is the case when θ > θ˜ where
θ˜ = (R0+R)[(1−)Y−pAR0]
N ·E[∆RAi (N)]Y
(condition 2).
By considering condition 1 and condition 2, it follows that under a full demo-
cratic system, we should have θ = θ̂ and θ̂ ≥ θ˜. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2.1
If the expected payoff from insurrection an agent gets when all peasants decide
to join coalition A (i.e, E
[
piWi (N, δ)
]
= R̂0 + θ · E
[
∆RAi (N)
]
) is compared with
the income that a peasant obtains in case of a redistribution among citizens of
the income generated from the sale of the natural resource, i.e.,
piRi (α)
(2) = pAR0 + pB
(
αR
N
)
it follows that:
E
[
piWi (N, δ)
] ≤ piRi (α)(2) ⇐⇒ α > ˜˜α
where
˜˜α = E [Y Wi ] ·N
R · pB =
pA
pB
α˜
On the contrary, if the government’s (expected) payoff is considered, it can be
proved that redistribution is a better solution with respect to conflict when:
E
[
piWB (N, δ)
] ≤ piRB(α)(2)
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where
E
[
piWB (N, δ)
]
= pB
{(
R̂0 + R̂
)
− θ ·N · E [∆RAi (N)]}
and
piRB(α)
(2) = [R0 +R · (1− α)] · pB
The equilibrium condition for the ruling party is, therefore, given by:
E
[
piWB (N, δ)
] ≤ piRB(α)(2) ⇐⇒ α ≤ ˜˜αB where˜˜αB = (R0+R)+θ·N ·E[∆RAi (N)]R
The proof is complete by verifying that ˜˜α ≤ ˜˜αB is always satisfied for E [Y Wi ] ·
N ≤ −E [Y WB ].57
57 This condition is satisfied for any values of R ≥ R, where
R = R0·{ρ·(N+1)−θ(1−)[pA−pB ]·N−[pAN+pB ]}pB ·−ρ [here, ρ = (pA − pB) · θ · λ (N, δ) · (1− )].
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Chapter 2
Exogenous Oil Shocks, Fiscal policy
and Sector Reallocations in Oil
Producing Countries
Previous literature has suggested that different mechanisms of transmission of
exogenous oil shocks are responsible for the negative effects on the economic
performances of oil exporting countries.
This paper aims at providing further evidence on the role of sectoral realloca-
tion between private and public sectors in explaining the impact of shocks to oil
revenues on the economic growth rates of oil producing countries. The effects
of oil shocks on the business cycle of oil producing countries are examined by
distinguishing between various components of public sector spending policy:
purchases of consumption goods, investments in productive activities and com-
pensation for public employees.
Simulation results from a simple theoretical model suggest that the possibility
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that crowding-out effects of public over private investments can explain a large
fraction of the negative effects of shocks to oil revenues on the private sector of
the economy. Since the growth in size of the public sector is not able to compen-
sate for the reduction in size of the private sector, an increase in oil revenues has
the effect to decrease total output and employment.
Finally, numerical results suggest that countries which are characterized by lower
levels of private investments in the steady state are the least affected by an ex-
ogenous oil shock with respect to countries where private investments have the
higher share in total output.
2.1 Introduction and literature review
There is a large body of research which tries to assess how oil shocks influence
the business cycle of oil producing countries. According to many empirical pa-
pers, countries which are endowed with relevant natural resources are charac-
terized by lower economic growth rates with respect to countries with few nat-
ural resources. Important studies on the failures of resource-led development
include, for instance, [57], [11], [12], [18], [74]. In particular, [12] find a strong
inverse relationship between the log of the export contribution to growth dur-
ing the period 1970-1990 and the log of natural resource abundance in 1970. [11]
briefly surveyed the Dutch disease explanation for the natural resource curse.
According to this mechanism, export windfalls may have adverse effects on
the real exchange rate of these countries. This, in turn, may render most other
exports uncompetitive. Thus a rapid and, often distorted, growth of the non-
tradeable sector may occur. In turn, the industrialization process of the country,
as well as the traditional economic sectors (i.e. agriculture), may be negatively
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affected. As noted by [18], countries that depend heavily on the export of nat-
ural resources tend to suffer from a variety of problems, including authoritarian
governance, antistate protests and/or civil wars, high corruption levels, high
poverty rates, etc.1, 2 In this work, we aim at studying a different, but by no
means less important, mechanism of transmission of oil shocks to the overall
economy of oil producing countries, which is represented by the reallocation ef-
fects associated to the fiscal policy implemented by the government.
Starting from the pioneristic works of [75], [76], [77], the effects of domestic re-
source discoveries on tradeable and non-tradeable sectors of open economies
have been assessed by many theoretical and empirical studies. According to
this branch of literature, oil discoveries prompts huge booms in investments,
especially in the non-traded goods sectors of the economy. In contrast, invest-
ments and profits in the traded sectors are squeezed by the oil boom. As the
non-traded goods sectors expand, the traded goods sectors of these countries
tend to shrink.
On the other hand, [78] emphasises the issues related to the effects of the spend-
ing policy implemented by the public sector. According to this author, poor
management of oil wealth and, in particular, inefficient spending by the public
sector induces significant imbalances in the internal market.
1For a review of the literature on the effects of oil endowments on oil producing countries see
[20].
2Other authors find a positive effect of a large endowment of oil and other mineral resources
on long-term economic growth. According to [20], although large endowments of oil and other
mineral resources do not affect significantly political institutions, positive effects on long-term
economic growth may nevertheless occur.
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[79] argue that distorted allocations of spending over time by the public sec-
tor are enhanced in the presence of common-pool problems or uncertainty over
property rights over the resource income. This fact, in turn, may further enhance
low economic performances. [80], in an analysis of how to improve economic
performance of the Gulf Council Countries, argue that oil wealth should be re-
allocated in such a way to improve economic incentives directed in boosting the
growth of the private sector.
More recently, studies by [81], [34], [82], among others, were interested in the
operational aspects of fiscal policy in oil producing countries. These works are
interested in offering indications on fiscal policy adjustments in order to reduce
the negative effects on sustainable economic growth arising from high volatile
and uncertain flow of oil revenues from abroad.
The reallocation effects of booms in resource revenues affect also oil importing
countries. Several papers argue that oil price shocks often require an unusual
amount of labour to be reallocated across industries of developed economies,
thereby increasing the unemployment rate in those periods. [83] contends that
reallocative shocks significantly affect aggregate unemployment by increasing
the amount of labour reallocation required. According to [84], macroeconomic
models typically assign primary importance to aggregate demand shocks in the
determination of the unemployment rate. This reflects the belief that shocks to
the composition of demand merely lead to a reallocation of labour resources
across industries. This evidence finds empirical support in [85], who shows
that oil prices Granger-cause unemployment. [86] argue that factor specializa-
tion and reallocation frictions led to reduced output and employment in the US
economy in the wake of the first OPEC oil price shock. The car industry was
particularly hit, as its actual features of factor inputs did not closely match the
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desired characteristics.3
In [87] Vector Autoregression models are used to investigate how different sec-
tors of the US economy have been affected by oil shocks. Results of impulse
response functions indicate that oil price increases mainly reduce supply for
high energy-intensive industries. On the other hand, oil price shocks affect
many other industries (such as the car industry) by reducing demand for their
products. According to [88], oil prices shocks are associated with variations in
employment shares and relative wages across industries. Results suggest that,
while real wages declines for all workers, wages for skilled workers increase.
This paper aims at providing further evidence on the effects of exogenous oil
shocks on the macroeconomic performances of oil exporting countries. It does
so by means of a simple theoretical framework based on the real business cycle
modelling of macroeconomic activity in oil producing countries. The questions
we would like to answer can be summarized as follows. How are oil shocks
likely to affect the economic activity of oil exporting countries? More specifi-
cally, what are the effects of oil shocks on consumption, investments and labour
markets? Do oil shocks increase the role of the public sector in the economy4?
How important are changes in the allocation of production inputs across sectors
in determining the economic consequences to exogenous oil shocks?
This paper extends the previous literature on the macroeconomic effects of ex-
3For instance, the auto industry and the network of dealership were specialized, respectively,
in the production and sale of large cars. Similarly, skills of workers in the auto industry and
research and design activities were directed in producing and engineering large cars. However,
the demand of this type of cars dropped as oil prices increased after the oil shocks.
4In the present paper, the word government and public sector are used interchangeably.
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ogenous oil shocks on the economic stance of oil exporting countries in various
directions. The hypothesis that oil price shocks drive large aggregate realloca-
tion of production factor is investigated by several previous studies. However,
earlier work lacks the sectoral detail on job creation and destruction that we
examine. Shifts in demand across sectors induced by changes in public spend-
ing is well documented in literature. For instance, [89] examine the effects of
changes in public spending on the reallocation of production factor in a two-
sector dynamic general equilibrium model. Under the assumption that changes
in public spending are ofthen sector-specific, shifts in the allocation of factors
across industries can lead to declines in employment and changes in the wages
paid across sectors. Differently from this literature, our analysis focuses on the
sectoral reallocation adjustment process that follows a negative wealth effect in-
duced by an exogenous oil shock. In particular, a two-sector economy in which
the public sector role is separately considered from the role of private firms is
considered.
Many assumptions of our analysis are similar to those considered in the work
by [90] on the cyclical effects of fiscal policy. Nevertheless, the focus is quite
different.5 We concentrate on the mechanism of transmission of exogenous oil
shocks on producing countries, whereas [90] considers the different effects of
government fiscal policy on both private and public sectors for the US economy.
A calibrated version of the model is simulated and sensitivity analysis over key
parameters and steady state values is implemented. A particular feature of our
5Several assumptions of the theoretical model also differ significantly with respect to this pa-
per. The main differences involves the source of exogenous growth, the functional form taken by
government budget constraint, the role of the public sector in the economy as far as productive
activities are concerned.
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model is that intervention of fiscal policy in the economic system is assumed to
take several forms: purchases of consumption goods, investments in productive
activities and compensation for public employees.
In this paper, we derive the analytical conditions under which the possibility
that a positive effect of oil shocks on the economic performances of exporting
countries arises. Implications of fiscal policies aimed at reducing the so-called
natural resource curse are, hence, presented.
One of the main results we obtain is that oil shocks cause a reallocation of eco-
nomic activities between the private and public sectors of the economy. Higher
spending and investments by the public sector reduces private wealth. Al-
though the estimated impact on demand for labour supply in the public sector is
positive, supply for private labour decreases. As the effect on the private sector
outpaces that on the public sector, the overall demand for leisure increases. In
addition, higher oil revenues seems to cause a crowding-out effects on both pri-
vate consumption and investment. All in all, while the role of the public sector
in the economy increases, the importance of the private sector lessens out. Since
this second effect tends to be larger with respect to the first one, the impact of
exogenous oil shocks on total output is negative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical model
employed in order to examine the macroeconomic effects of oil shocks in oil ex-
porting countries. In particular, Section 2.2.1 outlines the assumptions of the
framework employed in our analysis, while Section 2.2.2 considers the set-up
of our theoretical model. Section 2.3 investigates the consequences of distur-
bances to oil revenues to key macroeconomic variables. Section 2.3.1 describes
the framework implemented in order to calibrate model. While section 2.3.2 out-
lines the main results of one percent oil shock on both relevant variables public
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and private sectors. Section 2.3.3 discusses how results varies if different as-
sumptions on key parameters are made. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The theoretical model
2.2.1 Assumptions
The effects of exogenous oil shocks on the economic performance of oil export-
ing countries are studied bymeans of a simple neoclassical growthmodel where
preferences, technology and resource constraints for both private and public
agents are considered together with rules governing public finance. House-
holds, firms and the government interact in a variety of ways within a perfectly
competitive market structure.
Households
There is a representative householdwhich aims atmaximizing a discounted sum
of period utilities over an infinite planning horizon. The household has prefer-
ences over sequences of consumption and leisure and maximizes its expected
lifetime utility. The lifetime utiliy function is, in particular, given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtut (Ct, Lt, Gt)(2.1)
where E0 represents the expected value operator. Ct and Gt represent, respec-
tively, private and public consumption, while Lt denotes leisure.
According to this equation, future momentary utilities, ut, are discounted using
the subjective discount factor β, β ∈ (0, 1). The fully parameterized momentary
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utility function employed for simulation purposes is given by:
ut (Ct, Gt, Lt) =
(
Cψt G
1−ψ
t
)1−σ
L1+ϑt
1− σ(2.2)
where σ and ϑ denote preference parameters. In particular, σ > 0 is the inverse
of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption whereas, ψ is a para-
meter denoting the degree of substitutability between private and public con-
sumption expenditure. According to this period utility function, government
consumption expenditure provides utility for the household, as it represents a
substitute for private consumption.6 It can be easily verified that utility depends
positively on consumption services and leisure. Furthermore, it can be observed
that vL > 0 and vLL > 07 where v(Lt) = L1+ϑt , ϑ > 0. In other words, v(.) is an
increasing and convex function of leisure. Assuming constant leisure, these fea-
tures of the momentary utility function are compatible with steady state growth
in consumption. Thus, the specification of the period utility function we employ
ensures positive first and negative second derivatives of the utility function with
respect to consumption levels, i.e. uC > 0, uCC < 0, uG > 0, uGG < 0, that is util-
ity is an increasing and concave function in both private and public consump-
tion.
The household has a time endowment which is normalized to one. The sum of
time devoted to work and leisure cannot exceed its endowment of time. Conse-
quently, labour supply Nt and leisure Lt are related through the following time
6This assumption follows [90].
7vX and vXX denote, respectively, first and negative second derivatives of function v(X)with
respect to X.
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constraint:8
Lt +Nt = 1(2.3)
In addition, in each period the representative household faces a flow budget
constraint setting its total income equal to its total spending, that is:
WtNt +RtK
P
t = Ct + It(2.4)
where Wt is the real wage rate, Rt is the real rental rate on capital, It is gross
private investment.
Firms
Taking market prices as given, the firmmaximizes profit Πt from the production
of goods:
Πt = Y
P
t −WtNPt −RtKPt
where Y Pt denotes total private output at date t obtained through the following
Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y Pt = F
P
t (N
P
t , K
P
t ) = At
(
KPt
)θ (
NPt
)1−θ
θ ∈ (0, 1)(2.5)
whereKPt is the private capital stock andNPt is the quantity of labour input. The
Cobb-Douglas production function (2.5) is characterized by constant returns to
scale with respect to NP and KP .
The household owns a stock of capital (Kt) which is rented to the representa-
tive firm each period. The rule governing the process of capital accumulation is
8For simplicity, we assume that the time-endowment constraint of the household always
binds with equality.
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given by:
KPt+1 =
(
1− δP )KPt + It(2.6)
where δP is the rate of depreciation of private capital. In addition,K0 is assumed
to be constant.
The government
Finally, there is a government which hires labour from households, NGt and in-
vests a fraction of its revenues in order to produce government output. In ad-
dition, it purchases consumption goods from the market. The government has
only one sources of revenues: it owns a flow endowment of a natural resource
commodity (in our case, oil), whose value in each period t is given by Zt.9
In addition, public output is produced according to the following production
function:
Y Gt = F
G
t (N
G
t , K
G
t ) = At
(
KGt
)γ (
NGt
)1−γ
γ ∈ (0, 1)(2.7)
where NGt and KtG are the stock, of labour and capital employed by the gov-
ernment for production purposes and At denotes total production augmenting
technological progress.10 In equation (2.7), constant returns to scale over (pub-
9Although this seems to be a strong assumption, we need to remember that for high-indebted
poor countries oil often accounts for a very high percentage of government’s revenues and ex-
ports earnings.For instance, in Angola oil accounts for approximately 80% of the government’s
revenues and 90% of export earnings.
10This assumption allows us to differentiate the framework employed from that, for instance,
used by [90]. In this article,KGt enters directly in the private production function.
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lic) capital and labour are assumed.11
Government’s investment increases the capital stockKG subject to the following
law of motion:
KGt+1 =
(
1− δG)KGt +Xt(2.8)
where Xt denotes (exogenous) gross public investment and δP is the rate of de-
preciation of public capital.
In each period, the government faces the following budget constraint:
Zt = Gt +Xt +WtN
G
t(2.9)
where Zt denotes the flow of exogenous oil revenues the government obtains
from abroad. According to equation (2.9), the total amount of resources used
by the government for purchases of consumption goods, investments and com-
pensation for public employees can not exceed total external revenues. The pos-
sibility to differentiate between government’s purchases of consumption and
investment goods enable us to assess the relative importance of the different
mechanisms of transmission of the fiscal policy. In particular, we are able to
distinguish between the utility effects which arise from government’s purchases
and the effects on sectoral reallocation of employment and capital determined
by the productive decisions by the public sector .
Government’s fiscal policy responds to the stance of world’s economy summa-
rized by changes in oil prices. Consequently, a quantitative analysis of the re-
sponse of fiscal policy decisions (in particular, government investments and em-
ployment) to exogenous oil fluctuations has to be employed. Thus, we will be
11Please notice that, since in our analysis we focus on innovation caused by shocks in exoge-
nous oil revenues we abstract from the effects of the technical progress on the trend growth in
the economy. Therefore, At is assumed constant and equal to one.
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able to evaluate whether these components are positively or negatively related
to the business cycle of oil producing countries.
The quantitative analysis considered in this paper necessarily requires the spec-
ification of the process followed by the exogenous variable Zt. The stochastic
processes for prices and production levels are combined into a single process
which is described by the following formula:12
Zt = (1− ρZ)logZ + ρZ logZt−1 + t(2.10)
where ρZ < 1 and t denotes shocks to Zt. In other words, variable Zt evolve
according to AR(1) processes (autoregressive processes of order 1). Similarly, in
order to introduce persistence in the investment decisions by the government13
we assume that Xt = (1− ρX)logX + ρX logXt−1.
Finally, by combining the government budget constraint (2.9) with the house-
hold budget constraint (2.4), the following economy-wide constraint is obtained:
Ct + It + Zt ≤ Yt(2.11)
According to equations (2.9) and (2.11), consumption and investments by pri-
vate and public agents and compensation for public employees by the public
sector completely absorb the economy’s resources.
12This assumption is similar to that adopted by [91] which considered for oil revenues the
following process: dx(t) = µxx(t)dt + σxx(t)dzx(t) where dzx(t) are increments of a standard
Brownian motion process.
13See, for instance, [92].
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2.2.2 The Ramsey equilibrium
The equilibrium of the economy is obtained when the representative firm and
representative household solve their optimization problems, the public sector
satisfies its budget constraint and all markets clear. The rational expectations
equilibrium consists of the sequences of endogenous variables which satisfy the
following set of first order equations and accounting identities:
Wt =
∂F P (NPt , K
P
t )
∂NPt
=
∂FG(NGt , K
G
t )
∂NGt
(2.12)
Rt =
∂F P (NPt , K
P
t )
∂KPt
(2.13)
− ∂U(Ct, Nt)
∂Nt
=
∂U(Ct, Nt)
∂Ct
Wt(2.14)
∂U(Ct, Nt)
∂Ct
= βEt
[
∂U(Ct+1, Nt+1)
∂Ct+1
(
Rt+1 + 1− δP
)]
(2.15)
Nt ≡ NPt +NGt(2.16)
Yt ≡ Y Pt + Y Gt(2.17)
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) give the outcome of the maximizing behaviour by
firms. According to these expressions, equilibrium is guaranteed when the mar-
ginal productivities of labour and capital equals their marginal costs. Equation
(2.14) represents the household intratemporal efficiency condition governing its
labour supply and investment. This equation tells us that the marginal rate of
substitution between labour and consumption must be equal to the marginal
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product of labour. On the other hand, equation (2.15) establishes the intertem-
poral efficiency condition, that is the Euler equation first-order condition. At
equilibrium, the marginal cost, in terms of utility, of investing in more capital
should be equal to the expected marginal utility gain. Finally, equations (2.16)
and (2.17) show that labour and output markets clear when the sum of private
and public labour and production equals total supply.
Other conditions to be satisfied are given by the laws of motion for KP and KG
(equations 2.6 and 2.8), production functions by the private and public sectors
(equations 2.5 and 2.7), the government budget constraint (equation 2.9), the
process representing the behavior of exogenous oil shocks (equation 2.10), and
the economy-wide constraint (equation 2.11).
2.3 Solution of the model
2.3.1 Calibration
In this section the transmission mechanism of exogenous oil shocks to the econ-
omy’s structure of producing countries is analyzed in detail. In order to exam-
ine the effects of exogenous oil shocks on our simplified economy, the effects of
one positive percent shock to exogenous oil revenues on relevant variables are
here examined and discussed. The model’s cyclical implications are explorated
by means of a quantitative analysis based on simulation and calibration of the
economic model. For this purpose, equations which represent the competitive
equilibrium of the economy have to be log-linearized around the nonstochastic
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steady state of themodel.14 The next step consists in solving the resulting system
of linear difference equations. The details of the log-linear system are presented
in the Appendix.
The calibration procedure proposed by [93] is adopted. According to thismethod-
ology, the values of model’s parameters and steady state variables have to be
chosen to fit information on oil producing countries. In the present study, val-
ues for preference parameters β, σ, ψ, θ, γ, δP and δG coincides with those used
in previous quantitative studies (for instance, [94], [93] and [95]). Values of
steady-state variables C
Y
, G
Y
, I
Y
and X
Y
(average shares of - private and public -
consumption and investments on total output) and between government’s and
private employment and output (N
G
NP
and Y
G
Y
) are chosen to match the charac-
teristics of a high number of oil exporting countries. At this purpose, data from
widely recognized database (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2008,
[96] and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 2010,
[97]) are employed.
Consequently, impulse response functions of a one percent oil shock in period
one are shown using ρZ = 0.95 for the autocorrelation of the shock process. All
parameters and steady state values for the relevant variables used in the simu-
lation exercise are reported in Table 2.1.
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
14In what follows, constant steady state values of relevant variables are denoted by employing
symbols without the time subscript. On the other hand, lower-case letters with time subscript
are used to denote logarithm deviations of variables from their steady state value.
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The behaviour of relevant variables over 1000 samples of 200 observations15
is simulated over quarterly data by using the system of linear equations pre-
sented in the Appendix (equations 2.22 to 2.36) At this purpose, the recursive
method proposed by [98] and the Hodrick-Prescott technique are employed, re-
spectively, to simulate the model and to filter the model’s samples. The sample
means and standard deviations of the statistics over the full set of data set gen-
erated are, thus, calculated and shown in Table 2.2.
2.3.2 Effects of exogenous oil shocks
In this Section, the impulse responses induced by an exogenous oil shock on rel-
evant variables obtained by our model are examined. Figures 2.1 to 2.3 show the
impulse response to a one percent change in oil revenues.
A positive innovation shock to oil revenues is shown to cause an increase in con-
sumption goods expenditure by the government. As a result of the increase in
oil revenues, both public employment and demand of capital by the government
strongly increase. Higher production factors raise public output. In contrast, an
oil shock is associated with decreases of private consumption. This latter ef-
fect can be explained by observing that a rise in government spending tends to
crowde-out private demand for consumption goods (see [99], for further details
on this mechanism)16.
15In order tomatch the sample size often considered inmacroeconometric time-series analysis.
16These authors argue that the crowding-out effects of consumption in response to a rise in
government spending is due to the full-flexibility of prices and (or) the intertemporal optimiza-
tion problem faced by households.
79
With regard to the impact of the shock on the labour market, while employment
in the public sector increases, demand in the private sector falls significantly. In
other words, the exogenous increase in external revenues received by the gov-
ernment induces a sectoral reallocation between the private and public sector. In
particular, the oil shock causes a transfer of productive factors (labour and cap-
ital) from the private to the government sector. As the sensitivity exercise will
show, the magnitude of reallocation is strongly related to the size of marginal
productivity of factors in the two sectors. The diminishing marginal product of
labour (or capital) in the public production function could limit the reallocation
of factor across sector.
In other words, while an oil shock increases the role of the government in the
economy, it reduces resources available to the private sector. This fact implies
that the link between public employment and the marginal utility of consump-
tion is not strong enough to compensate for the negative wealth effect due to the
increase in government expenditure on private consumption.
In addition, as far as the effects of the oil shock on the private investments are
concerned, it can be noticed that, because of the combined effect of consumption
decreases and interest rates increases, total investments by the private sector fall
significantly. Due to the strong slump of the process of accumulation of capital,
private employment responds negatively to the oil shock. Private labour mar-
ket dynamics over the business cycle are, in this case, mainly explained by the
opposite effects of oil shocks on the supply of labour and its average produc-
tivity. The overall negative effect on private capital and employment induces a
contraction in private output.
As demand for leisure increases, total employment decreases despite the posi-
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tive effect of the oil shock on public employment. Consequently, since the nega-
tive effects on the private sector tends to outpace the positive impact that char-
acterizes the public sector, higher oil revenues usually decreases total output.
Therefore, the combined effects on public and private sectors prompts total out-
put to fall significantly. In other words, under our assumptions, the components
of government fiscal policy are countercyclical since they move in opposite di-
rection with respect to the fluctuations of output generated by the exogenous oil
shock.
[INSERT FIGURES 2.1 TO 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
2.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section the sensitivities of the results to overall oil shocks on our econ-
omy to changes in key parameters with respect to those presented in Table 2.1
are explored. In particular, several simulation exercises are considered. In the
first exercise, the importance of the size of private consumption is examined in
order to assess the overall effects of oil shocks on our model economy. In the
second exercise, different assumptions over the production function of Y P are
considered. In particular, parameter γ is assumed to take different values. As-
sumptions on the different role of oil resources in the economy and on the size
of governments are also considered. Results are displayed by simulating our
model under the assumption of different steady state values for Z
Y
and N
P
N
.
Finally, the simulation exercise is repeated by modifying the model in order to
evaluate how results changes as parameter ψ varies , that is, by considering dif-
ferent positive effects arising to households from different type of fiscal policy.
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All the parameters employed for our sensitivity analysis are reported in Table
2.3.17
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2.4 shows the impulse response functions of both the public and private
sectors to a one percent oil shock by considering different assumptions on the
characteristics of the economy. Simulation results are obtained by employing
varying values for the ratios between consumption and private investments in
steady state. In Figure 2.4, the black and blue lines correspond to the case of a
ratio between private consumption and investments equal to five and four, re-
spectively. Other scenarios involve a significantly higher investment levels by
the representative agent. In case three (green line), the ratio between private
consumption and investments (C
I
) is assumed to equal three, whereas, under
case four (red line), the ratio between consumption and investment is set to be
equal to two.
Results suggest that private investments continue to be crowded-out by the ex-
pansion of government role in the economy induced by an exogenous oil shock.
However, it can be observed that the negative effects of the oil shock on private
investment decrease as the steady state value of the ratio between private in-
vestment and consumption increases.
The responses of both public employment and output seem not to be related to
the percentage of private investments on the total size of the private sector in
steady state. Viceversa, it is apparent from Figure 2.4 that, as the ratio C/I falls,
17For all the exercises presented in this section, the equilibrium we find is characterized by
saddle path stability.
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the negative impact on private consumption, employment and output decreases.
The explanation behind this result is that the fiscal policy through a negative ef-
fect on private wealth may, under certain circumstances, causes expansions in
employment (see case four). Under the assumption of a lower ratio between
consumption and investment in steady state, numerical results suggest that an
oil shock has initially a negative effect on total output and employment. How-
ever, as the contraction of private labour decreases, the effect on real interest
rates becomes negative and private consumption starts increasing, the percent-
age change of total output and employment becomes positive.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.4 ABOUT HERE]
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show how results vary if changes on the assumptions on
the importance of oil resources and of the size public sector are made. Results
from numerical simulations suggest that the negative effects on the private sec-
tor widen as the percentages of oil revenues on total output and the ratio of total
public employment on total employment increase. Another interesting result is
that the positive impact on public labour and output tends to be lower for the
economies that in steady state are more dependent on oil revenues and for those
in which the size of the government is bigger.
[INSERT FIGURES 2.5 AND 2.6 ABOUT HERE]
In Figure 2.7 impulse response functions of relevant variables to a one percent
oil shock are examined by taking into account several assumptions on the char-
acteristics of the production function. In particular, scenarios are constructed
by considering various values of parameter γ. For public employment and out-
put, Figure 2.7 shows that quite similar qualitative predictions are obtained by
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varying the assumptions of the model. In particular, according to all model
specifications, a positive oil shock continues to have important negative effects
on private wealth as well as consequences on the process of sectoral reallocation
of production factors between the private and public sectors of the economy. As
a result of these mechanisms of transmission of fluctuations to the oil revenues,
significant decreases in private consumption and increases in compensation for
public employees occur after a few quarters from the shock. However, the im-
pact on these variables tends to be lower when production by the public sector
becomes more capital-intensive. This result implies that the reduction in total
output and employment following an oil shock is negatively correlated with pa-
rameter γ.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.7 ABOUT HERE]
How does the economy responds to a positive oil shocks if household’s utility
function is assumed to depend on government consumption? How do these re-
sponses depend on the values assumed by parameter ψ? 18 As we have seen
from equation (2.2), the utility function parameter ψ represents the degree of
substitutability between private and public consumption in the utility function
of the representative agent.
Figure 2.8 displays the impact response of relevant variables for given values of
this parameter. In particular, as ψ takes higher values, the negative wealth effect
associated with the oil shock increases. On the one hand, the effect of the exoge-
nous oil shocks on demand for private labour, consumption and output tends
18All results examined in Section 2.3.2 are obtained by considering a parameter ψ set equal to
zero.
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to be damped (see, for instance, case four). Under these assumptions, a positive
oil shock results in a reduction in the size of the private sector and an increase
of both public employment and labour.
On the contrary, as ψ decreases, the direct intervention by the government on the
economy diminishes. As a consequence, the positive impact of the exogenous
oil shock on public employment and output falls as well. Similarly, the negative
effect on private investment decreases with parameter ψ. This fact implies that,
in case of a relatively high preference rate for the public provided consumption
good by the representative agents (case one) a mechanism similar to the Key-
nesian multiplier works. According to this mechanism, accumulation of private
capital causes further expansions of employment and output.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.8 ABOUT HERE]
To summarize the main results we have obtained in this Section, a positive im-
pact of the exogenous oil shock on the economic growth of oil exporting coun-
tries is guaranteed under certain assumptions on key parameters. In fact, our ex-
ercise of simulation suggests that, after an exogenous oil shock, countries which
are characterized by higher levels of private investment in steady state tend to
have higher rate of growth for both private and public sectors.
Moreover, our results do support the possibility to reduce the negative economic
effects from an oil shock by reducing the direct (i.e. productive) intervention of
government in the productive activities of the country. The negative effects in-
crease proportionally with the importance of oil revenues and of the size of the
public sector in the economy.
Finally, as the degree of substitutability between public and private consump-
tion increases, the wealth and reallocation effects associated to a higher level
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of government consumption decrease. As a result, the negative effect of the oil
shock on the economy also lessens out.
2.4 Concluding remarks
Exogenous oil shocks have been argued to negatively affect the economic stance
of producing countries. The main thesis we present in this paper is that, in order
to evaluate the impact on the economic performances of an oil producing coun-
try, a researcher must address the negative wealth effects and the reallocation
process causes by the fiscal policy implemented by the government.
Through a simple economic model we have assessed that changes in the spend-
ing decisions by the government can imply a strong negative wealth effect on
the private sector. Because of the shift of productive factors from the households
and firms to the government sector, private consumption, employment and out-
put can show strong negative changes after the shock. Under these assumptions,
a crowding-out effect on private investment may also arise. In addition, since
the negative effect on private output, employment and private investment due
to from increases in government goods purchases is only in part compensated
by the positive impact which derives from the employment policy by the gov-
ernment, positive fluctuations of oil revenues are associated with a decrease in
total employment and output.
For several assumptions on key parameters and steady-state values of vari-
ables of interest, numerical simulations of the our theoretical model show results
which are consistent with negative response of total employment and labour to
exogenous oil shocks. However, results from sensitivity analysis suggest that
positive effects on the economic growth of oil exporting countries are guaran-
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teed under certain assumptions concerning the decisions on the fiscal policy im-
plemented by governments. In particular, countries which are characterized by
higher levels of private investment in steady state are able to receive significant
economic benefits in terms of growth of both goods and labour market from an
exogenous oil shock. Finally, if substitutability between government and private
consumption is allowed for, the possibility of oil shock to negatively affect the
business cycle of producing countries may be seriously reduced.
According to the overall results of our analysis, producing countries could be
able to manage oil booms well by not allowing the public sector to increase sig-
nificantly after the oil shock. The possibility to avoid wasteful and inefficient
spending policy by the goverments of these countries could reduce the negative
effects which arise from the exogenous increase in wealth.
This paper faces several questions with regard to the implementation of fiscal
policy in oil exporting countries. However, our analysis could be enriched along
several directions. In particular, future research could be aimed in formulating
additional guidelines for government spending decisions which arise from the
flow of oil revenues. In order for producing nations to reduce the negative ef-
fects arising from the high volatility and uncertainty of oil revenues, according
to [81], the government should target the non-oil balance. The accumulation of
financial wealth over the period of oil production could enable producing coun-
tries to face in a proper manner the challenges arising from oil shocks. The in-
troduction of these aspects in a more complete theoretical framework represents
an interesting topic for future studies.
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Table 2.1: Parameter values and steady state variable
a) Parameter
Preferences β = 0.99
σ = 0.32
ψ = 0.00
ϑ = 0.25
ρX = 0.735
Production θ = 0.30
γ = 0.30
δP = 0.025
δG = 0.010
Exogenous oil revenues ρZ = 0.95
b) Steady State Variables
Private Sector Y = 1.00
C/Y = 0.66
I/Y = 0.17
Government G/Y = 0.10
(WNP )/Y = 0.03
X/Y = 0.04
Oil Sector Z/Y = 0.17
Market Clearing Condition N = 0.20
NP/N = 0.10
Y G/Y P = 0.10
Notes. This table shows the values of parameter values and steady
state variables used in the simulation exercise.
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Table 2.2: Results of the calibration exercise
Series (a) (b)
Private capital 0.11 0.42
Public capital 0.25 -0.42
Total output 0.08 1.00
Private output 0.13 0.86
Public output 0.27 -0.08
Consumption 0.15 1.00
Private investment 1.27 0.98
Public investment 7.09 -0.97
Government Consumption 2.91 1.00
Labour 0.12 1.00
Private labour 0.15 0.94
Public labour 0.28 0.02
Wages 0.03 0.88
Interest rate 0.07 -0.88
Oil revenues 0.93 -0.99
Notes. a) Standard deviations in percent.
b) Correlations with output.
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Table 2.3: Sensitivity analysis: parameter and steady state values
a) Different size of the private sector∗
Case 1 (C1) C/I = 5
Case 2 (C2) C/I = 4
Case 3 (C3) C/I = 3
Case 4 (C4) C/I = 2
b) Different role of oil revenues in the economy
Case 1 (C1) Z/Y = 0.10
Case 2 (C2) Z/Y = 0.15
Case 3 (C3) Z/Y = 0.20
Case 4 (C4) Z/Y = 0.25
c) Different structure of the economy
Case 1 (C1) NP/N = 0.80
Case 2 (C2) NP/N = 0.70
Case 3 (C3) NP/N = 0.60
Case 4 (C4) NP/N = 0.50
d) Different assumptions over γ
Case 1 (C1) γ = 0.3
Case 2 (C2) γ = 0.5
Case 3 (C3) γ = 0.7
Case 4 (C4) γ = 0.9
e) Government consumption expenditure in the households utility function
Case 1 (C1) ψ = 0.40
Case 2 (C2) ψ = 0.60
Case 3 (C3) ψ = 0.80
Case 4 (C4) ψ = 0.99
Notes. ∗ In all cases considered, it is assumed that (C + I)/Y = 0.90.
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Figure 2.1: The effect on the private sector
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Notes. Figures show the percentage impulse responses of private sector variables to one per cent shock to oil revenues in 
period 1. 
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Figure 2.2: The effect on the public sector
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Notes. Figures show the percentage impulse responses of public sector variables to one per cent shock to oil revenues in period 1. 
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Figure 2.3: Reallocation effects of exogenous shocks on total output, employ-
ment and capital
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Notes. Figures show the percentage impulse responses of output, labour and capital to one per cent shock to oil revenues in period 1. 
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Figure 2.4: Does the composition of the private sector matter?
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Notes. Figures show the percentage impulse responses to one per cent shock to oil revenues in period 1 under different 
assumptions on the C/I ratio. 
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Figure 2.5: Different role of oil revenues in the economy
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Notes. Figures show the percentage impulse responses to one per cent shock to oil revenues in period 1 under different 
assumptions on the ratio Z/Y. 
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Figure 2.6: Different size of public sector
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Notes. Figures show the percentage impulse responses to one per cent shock to oil revenues in period 1 under different 
assumptions on the ratio NP/N. 
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Figure 2.7: Different assumptions over γ
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Notes. Figures show the percentage impulse responses to one per cent shock to oil revenues in period 1 under different 
assumptions on parameter γ. 
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Figure 2.8: Case of government consumption which enters households’ utility
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Notes. Figures show the percentage impulse responses to one per cent shock to oil revenues in period 1 under different 
assumptions on parameter ψ. 98
Appendix to Chapter 2
A1. Equilibrium conditions
In this appendix we reproduce the optimization problem faced by the household
and by the firms.
The household chooses sequences {Ct, Nt, Kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize the intertem-
poral utility function (2.1) subject to the flow budget constraint (2.4) and to equa-
tion (2.3). Let us set the Lagrangian for the household maximization problem:
LH = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

(
Cψt G
1−ψ
t
)1−σ
L1+ϑt
1− σ + λt
{
WtNt +RtK
P
t − Ct −
[
KPt+1 − (1− δ)KPt
]}
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to equation (2.4).
The first-order conditions for an interior solution to the household’s problem are
represented by:
∂LH
∂Ct
: ψC
[ψ(1−σ)]−1
t G
(1−ψ)(1−σ)
t (1−Nt)1+ϑ = λt(2.18)
∂LH
∂Nt
:
1
1− σ
[
Cψt G
1−ψ
t
]1−σ
(1 + ϑ)(1−Nt)ϑ = λtWt(2.19)
∂LH
∂KPt+1
: λt = βEt [(Rt+1 + 1− δ)λt+1]
∂LH
∂λ
: KPt+1 = Y
d − Ct + (1− δ)KPt = 0
or, if we consider, equation (2.6):
∂LH
∂λ
: It = Y
d − Ct
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where Y d = WtNt +RtKPt .
Other conditions to consider are given by equations (2.3), (2.6) and by the transver-
sality condition limt→∞λtKPt+1 = 0.
By combining equations (2.18) and (2.19) we get:
1
1− σ
[
Cψt G
1−ψ
t
]1−σ
(1 + ϑ)(1−Nt)ϑ = WtψC [ψ(1−σ)]−1t G(1−ψ)(1−σ)t (1−Nt)1+ϑ
or
1 + ϑ
(1− σ)ψ ·
Ct
1−Nt = Wt(2.20)
On the other hand, the Euler equation first order condition can be written as:
ψC
[ψ(1−σ)]−1
t G
(1−ψ)(1−σ)
t (1−Nt)1+ϑ =
βEt
[
(Rt+1 + 1− δ)ψC [ψ(1−σ)]−1t+1 G(1−ψ)(1−σ)t+1 (1−Nt+1)1+ϑ
]
(2.21)
Equations (2.20) and (2.21) represent, respectively, the intratemporal and intertem-
poral equilibrium conditions for the households.
As far as the decisions on production levels faced by firms and the government,
behaviour aimed at profit maximization implies that the marginal product of
each factor has to be set equal to its user cost. Hence, equilibrium conditions for
the firm are represented by:
∂Y Pt
∂NPt
: At(1− θ)
(
KPt
NPt
)θ
= Wt
∂Y Pt
∂KPt
: Atθ
(
KPt
NPt
)1−θ
= Rt
or, if we consider equation (2.5):
Wt = (1− θ)
(
Y Pt
NPt
)
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Rt = θ
(
Y Pt
KPt
)
Similarly, with regard to the productive decisions on public output by the gov-
ernment we have:
∂Y Gt
∂NGt
: At(1− γ)
(
KGt
NGt
)γ
= Wt
A2. Log-linearization of the economic model
Since we have a set of both linear and nonlinear equations, in order to solve
for the system we need to approximate it by a corresponding set of linear equa-
tions. Consequently, the following steps have to be followed. First, we need to
solve for the nonstochastic steady state. In that case, since no trend growth in
exogenous variable is assumed, all variables take constant values. This implies
the absence of uncertainty. In addition, in our representation of the economy
variables tend to fluctuate around the values given by this path. Second, we
have to log-linearize all the equations. According to our model and employing
the specification for the momentary utility function of the household given by
equation (2.2), the economy is well approximated by the following system of
linear equations:
• equilibrium conditions for wages:
wt = θ
(
nPt − kPt
)
(2.22)
wt = γ
(
nGt − kGt
)
(2.23)
• equilibrium condition for interest rates:
rt = (θ − 1)
(
nPt − kPt
)
(2.24)
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• intratemporal constraint for the households:
wt = ct − nt(2.25)
• intertemporal constraint for the households:
{[ψ(1− σ)]− 1} ct + [(1− ψ)(1− σ)] gt + (1 + ϑ)nt =(2.26)
Et [{[ψ(1− σ)]− 1} ct+1 + [(1− ψ)(1− σ)] gt+1 + (1 + ϑ)nt+1 + µ · rt+1]
where µ = 1− β(1− δP ).
• production function of the private-sector firms:
yPt = θk
P
t + (1− θ)nPt(2.27)
• production function of the government:
yGt = γk
G
t + (1− γ)nGt(2.28)
• law of motion for private and public capital:
kPt = δ
P it + (1− δP )kPt−1(2.29)
kGt = δ
Gxt + (1− δG)kGt−1(2.30)
• the aggregate resource constraint:
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
it +
Z
Y
zt(2.31)
• market-clearing condition for total output:
yt =
Y P
Y
yPt +
Y G
Y
yGt(2.32)
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• labour market-clearing condition:
nt =
NP
N
nPt +
NG
N
nGt(2.33)
• government budget constraint:
zt =
G
Z
gt +
X
Z
xt +
WNG
Z
(nt + wt)(2.34)
• evolution of other variables (Zt and Xt):
zt = ρzzt−1 + t−1(2.35)
xt = ρxxt−1(2.36)
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Chapter 3
How Oil Production Responds to
World Oil Demand and Price
Changes: Theoretical and Empirical
Evidence.
In this paper, decisions behind production levels for oil exporting countries are
studied by means of both theoretical and empirical models. Under the assump-
tions of exogenous oil prices and world oil demand, we are able to describe how
decisions on oil production levels vary according to changes of conditions on
the world oil market. We argue that an important factor which is able to affect
these decisions is represented by the cost structure of oil producing countries.
Results from the simulation of our theoretical model suggest that oil production
changes are strongly correlated with changes in world oil demand and real oil
price changes. However, although producing countries show a significant rela-
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tionship between their output levels and total demand, the effect of oil prices on
oil production decisions seems to be much lower.
By means of econometric analysis based on cointegration techniques, different
responses to world oil demand and real oil prices seem to characterize decisions
of relevant oil producting countries. As far as the responses to changes in total
demand are concerned, production adjusts with few lags to increases in con-
sumption. On the contrary, responses by oil production levels to innovations
in real oil prices are argued to be much lower. In addition, when asymmet-
ric econometric are introduced, evidence of nonlinear effects of output levels to
shocks in demand levels and oil prices is found.
Finally, according to our theoretical framework, an upward sloping Kaplan-
Meier hazard function is valid for oil producers’ decisions on output levels. This
result is confirmed when an empirical model is applied to time-series represent-
ing oil production levels.
3.1 Introduction
Developments in the world oil market have been studied in various fields of
economics. In many articles, the structure of the world oil market as well as
the determinants of oil production decisions are considered and examined by
means of both empirical and theoretical models. From a microeconomic point
of view, the world oil market is said to be dominated by a cartel of oil producers
(OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, see, inter alia, [100]).1
1Nevertheless, [101] and [102] reject the assumption that OPEC represents a “dominant pro-
ducer”. According to the empirical analysis of [101], in particular, the structure of the Organiza-
tion of producing countries is said to be dominated by Saudi Arabia who is argued to act like a
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This organization is able to affect prices by restricting or expanding its output
through a system of quotas assigned to each of Organization’s member coun-
tries. On the other hand, there is a set of producing countries which represent
the “competitive fringe” of the market2.
Oil production changes related to developments in international markets since
the foundation in 1960 of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries
are examined in [105] and [106]. [105] argue that, in spite of rapid increases in
world oil demand, since the late 1960s production by non-OPEC countries has
not changed significantly while, on the other hand, OPEC countries saw their
production levels increase. A likely explanation of this evidence lies in the fact
that these countries were facing rising extraction costs.
Similarly, after the first oil shock, despite the quadrupling of oil prices (1974-
1978), production by non-OPEC countries have remained stable. Viceversa,
since 1976, oil production in these countries have expanded significantly. New
major discoveries in Mexico and a huge increase of production from new fields
in the North-Sea and Alaska allowed non-OPEC production to increase by about
6 percent between 1976 and 1983.
Differently from [105], [106] examines the role of national oil companies in world
oil markets. According to his analysis, rising world oil demand and higher
prices are among the main factors responsible for the increase of oil produc-
tion of many oil companies since 2003.
In order to assess the responsiveness of oil production to demand and prices,
“swing producer” (see [103]).
2For an analysis of the stability of collusive behavior in the presence of producers which take
the price as given by the Organization of producing countries see, for instance, [104].
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other authors propose to consider the importance of investment’s decision. For
instance, [107] argue that huge oil price increases often lead to investments in
oil exploration.3 As a consequence, investments decisions implemented in the
previous years are argued to be one of the main determinant of current oil pro-
duction.
Oil production is also modelled by several authors in order to test various as-
sumptions on the structure of the world oil market. For instance, [108] consid-
ered different models for OPEC countries (a) the competitive model; b) the cartel
model; c) the target revenue model and d) the property rights model) using data
on oil production for the 1983-1988 period.
The possibility to test the model introduced by Griffin has recently been exam-
ined by, among others, [109], [110] and [111]. In [109], in particular, a supply
function is estimated using data from 1973 to 1997. The aim of his study is to
determine how oil supply of both OPEC and non-OPEC countries respond to oil
price changes. Results suggest a negative and significant elasticity of production
of OPEC countries to prices. On the contrary, for many non-OPEC countries pos-
itive and significant coefficients are obtained.
[112] consider a computational general equilibriummodel with the aim of evalu-
ating the effects of shocks to crude oil demand and supply on prices and produc-
tion levels for Saudi Arabia. As far as the responses of production of producing
countries to the global economy are concerned , [112] suggests that OPEC coun-
tries with the notable exception of Saudi Arabia tend to adjust output levels to
changes in the stance of world economy. On the contrary, because of the high
3According to the author, recent examples are represented by exploration in Alaska, Siberia
and North Sea.
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share of capital input in the production function of this country, output levels
show a low degree of correlationwith demand shocks. Nevertheless, output lev-
els responds differently to increases and decreases of world oil demand. In fact,
in the case of a negative demand shock, production levels are reduced rapidly
in order to sustain prices. On the contrary, following a positive innovation on
the demand side, production levels tend not to be expanded accordingly.
Simulations of theoretical models suggest a low responsiveness of oil produc-
tion to changes in world oil demand and prices also for non-OPEC countries. In
particular, according to [113]4 between 1999 and 2020 oil production increases
are projected to be only half as much of changes in world oil demand.
In [115] the domestic oil sector of a small oil producer like Egypt is modelled by
means of a dynamic computer simulation model. The authors suggest that the
possibility to adjust production on the basis of developments in world oil prices
is constrained by the fact that, in this country, the oil sector often operates near
full capacity.
Finally, in [116] the effects of geological, economic and political factors on total
oil supply in the United States are examined. Econometric techniques are em-
ployed to model extraction levels for the lower 48 states. Results suggest that,
because of high costs associated to the extraction of oil, negative oil price shocks
affect negatively production levels.
Our analysis focuses on the countries which, because of their size or that of their
oil reserves, are characterized by production levels which are not able to affect
prices. That is, these actors of the world oil market are assumed to take prices
as exogenously given. This assumption is explicitly considered by [117] which
4See also [114].
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describe how decisions on optimal production levels vary when different as-
sumptions on marginal extraction costs are made. In other words, although oil
production is important for the economy of these countries, it is not able to affect
international oil prices. Our study aims, in particular, at examining the behavior
of these countries under assumptions regarding the stance of world oil markets.
One of our purposes is to establish how production levels respond to changes in
world oil demand and prices.
Although previous research has already considered the determinants of deci-
sions on oil production levels (see, for instance, the article by [109]), relatively
few studies have examined the rigidity of these decisions to changes in the
stance of world oil markets. This paper aims, in particular, at filling the gap
in our understanding of the relationship between oil production levels, inter-
national oil prices and world oil demand. At this purpose, results from both a
theoretical model and an empirical analysis are presented. The implications of
our results with regard to the effects on the overall structure of the markets are
also discussed.5
In this paper, a simple theoretical model is designed in order to describe the be-
haviour over oil production levels for a representative small producing country.
Results from numerical simulation of our theoretical model suggest that produc-
tion levels tend to adjust rapidly to changes in the stance of world oil market.
These decisions are likely to depend on the cost structure of these oil produc-
ers. In addition, different responses to changes in world oil demand and real oil
5Our analysis also differs from the study by Ramcharran because of the empirical methodol-
ogy adopted. While [109] focuses on a simple supply function specified as lnQt = α + γ lnPt
estimated by using annual observations, we employ monthly data and, thus, more appropriate
AutoRegressive Distributed Lag or Error Correction Models.
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prices are argued to characterize the decisions on production levels. On the one
hand, decisions on output levels by several producing countries are proved to
depend significantly from increases in world oil demand. On the contrary, on
the basis of simulation exercises, we can argue that the response of oil produc-
ing countries to changes in real oil prices is lower. Finally, an upward sloping
Kaplan-Meier hazard function is argued to well describe oil production deci-
sions for many countries.
Empirical models are, hence, employed to describe data regarding oil produc-
tion levels for a significant sample of oil producing countries. The implications
of our theoretical model are consequently directly tested. In particular, the sta-
tistical relationship which characterizes oil production, world oil demand and
real oil prices is examined by means of standard time-series econometric tech-
niques.6 As a first step of the analysis, the order of integration of these variables
is tested. Following Engle and Granger ([119]) both the long-run and short-run
relationships existing between the series are estimated. According to the results
obtained we are able to confirm different responses to variations in world oil
demand and prices. While the effect of world oil demand changes on oil pro-
duction levels is statistical significant, the hypothesis of no effects from oil price
changes to oil output can not be rejected. Finally, the hypothesis of asymmetric
effects of increases and decreases of world oil demand and real oil prices on oil
production levels is examined and discussed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, our theoretical model is pre-
sented. In Subsection 3.2.1 the main assumptions of the the our framework are
6Previously, [100] and [118] have employed cointegration and causality tests in order to test
the assumption of output coordination between OPEC member countries. At this regard, our
paper is different from these works.
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presented. The procedure directed at calibrating and simulating the model in
order to match actual data for oil producers is given in Subsection 3.2.2. Results
of how oil production levels reacts to changes in world oil demand and oil prices
are examined in Subsection 3.2.3. In Section 3.3 econometric techniques are in-
troduced to evaluate the relationship between output levels, total demand and
real oil prices. In particular, in Subsection 3.3.1 data regarding oil production for
a significant set of producing countries are presented. Subsection 3.3.2 describes
the empirical framework employed to test the relationships existing between oil
production, total demand and real oil prices. Econometric results are examined
and discussed in Subsection 3.2.3. Section 3.4 presents our concluding remarks.
3.2 The Theoretical Model
3.2.1 The Model
Consider the production decisions of an oil exporting country. Producers are
assumed to behave as price takers. In other words, we consider a partial equi-
librium model in which producers set output levels by ignoring other produc-
ers’ levels (that is, decisions by single producers are not correlated). They are
“small” producers in the sense that they are not able to affect price levels. Our
assumption is that, while OPEC strategy is able to affect equilibrium conditions
on world oil markets,7 these oil exporting countries adjust their production to
7According to [110], because of decisions over production quotas and capacity utilization,
OPEC is able to affect market prices.
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changes in world oil demand and oil prices.8 , 9
Single-period profits are given by:
Πt = qt (Pt − ct)
where ct and qt denote marginal costs and oil production at time t whereas Pt
represents real oil prices.
In that follows, we will assume that unit costs are given by:
(3.1) ct = γ
(
qt
Dt
)θ
where Dt denotes world oil demand; hence, qtDt denotes relative oil production
(i.e. the share of demand satisfied by the production of the oil company).10 γ
is a scale parameter. Equation 3.1 embodies the fact that production costs and
the level of reserves are related through an inverse relationship.11. The ratio
of production over total demand is considered on the basis of the assumption
that producers monitor their market share. According to equation (3.1) marginal
costs are an increasing function of oil production. We are assuming that, because
of finite reserves, as production levels of previous years increase and oil becomes
8This assumption has previously been considered by, among others, [120], [117], [115]and
[114]. In particular, [115] argue that for an exporting country, like Egypt, “oil prices are clearly
significant exogenous”.
9Notice also that, in non-OPEC countries, oil is often extracted by a set of international oil
companies.
10For the purposes of this analysis, the terms “oil company” and “(small) oil producers” are
used interchangeably.
11See [121] for an analysis of this assumptions.
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more difficult to extract, unit costs increases.
Consequently, given exogenous oil prices, profits can be expressed as follows:
Πt =
qt
Dt
(
Pt − γ
(
qt
Dt
)θ)
Since production is not fully flexible, we assume that, in order to change pro-
duction, oil company’s costs increase by a factor ψ. This implies that, according
to changes in world oil demand fromDt to D̂t, optimal production levels change
from qt to q̂t. As a consequence, relative profits will be given by:
(3.2) Π̂t =
q̂t
D̂t
(
Pt − γ
(
q̂t
D̂t
)θ)
− ψγIt
We will assume that the natural logarithm of oil prices evolves according to a
random walk:
logPt = logPt−1 + t
where t is distributed according to a N(0, σ2 ) process. On the other hand, the
process for world oil demand (expressed in natural logarithms) is given by:
∆logDt = µ+ ηt
where ∆logDt = logDt − logDt−1 and ηt is distributed according to a N(0, σ2η)
process. In other words, the series is stationary around a trend.12
12These results are confirmed by simple regression analysis. Moreover, data strongly reject the
possibility to introduce the series denoting the world oil demand as an additional explanatory
variable of oil prices. Similarly, in a regression of oil demand the coefficient of oil prices is not
statistically different from zero.
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3.2.2 Solution of the Model
The theoretical model described in Section 3.2.1 is simulated for the actual evo-
lution of oil production values over the 1980-2009 period. In doing that, we have
to choose values to assign to the parameters of the model (that is, β, θ, ψ, µ, γ, σ2
and , σ2η). The yearly discount factor is assumed to be equal to β = 0.96.
From simple regression analysis based on Energy Information Administration
data, parameters µ and σ2η are estimated to be equal to 0.00161 and 0.0084, re-
spectively. On the basis of an econometric analysis of oil prices behavior, we
assign to σ2 a parameter value of 0.0923.
Finally, values for parameters θ, ψ and γ are chosen to match data for rele-
vant crude oil producers. In fact, the oil market is characterized by countries
which are characterized by varying extraction costs due to different values for
oil proven reserves, differences in feature of oil reservoirs etc.
This implies that in the world oil market there is an heterogenous set of coun-
tries. While, in response to demand and supply conditions, countries that have
low extraction costs tend to rapidly adjust production levels, producers charac-
terized by low levels of spare capacity face more rigid extraction decisions.
The model is solved by value function iteration on the Bellman equation. Our
iteration procedure produces the value function V
(
q
D
, P
)
and policy function{(
q
D
)′
, P ′
}
= h(
{
q
D
, P
}
) after taking a random draw from the distribution of 
and η each period.
The model is simulated for 60,000 time periods. The first 100 observations are
dropped in order not to consider a possibly sub-optimal starting point for our
oil producer. The state space for
{
q
D
, P
}
is assumed to be discrete. While the
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relative production, rq = q
D
lies in the set:[
rqmin, rqmin +
rqmax − rqmin
Nrprod − 1 , rqmin + 2 ·
rqmax − rqmin
Nrprod − 1 , . . . , rqmax
]
the state space for P is given by:[
Pmin, Pmin +
Pmax − Pmin
NP − 1 , Pmin + 2 ·
Pmax − Pmin
NP − 1 , . . . , Pmax
]
Values for rqmin, rqmax, Pmin and Pmax are chosen to avoid that the optimal pro-
duction level is higher (lower) with respect to the upper (lower) endpoint of the
state space of q.13
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2 the profit function is depicted together the value and pol-
icy functions of our oil producer.
[INSERT FIGURES 3.1 AND 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
As it can be seen in Figure 3.1, profits are a strictly concave function with respect
to both relative production and oil prices. On the other hand, the value function
is given by:
V
(
qt−1
Dt
, Pt
)
= maxqt
[
Πt + βEtV
(
qt
Dt+1
, Pt+1
)]
and takes into account the decision by the oil producer to change or not its pro-
duction once conditions in the world oil market have changed. As Figure 3.2
shows, the particular pattern of the policy function depends on the fact that, if
oil producers decide to change their output levels, profits do not change linearly
(see equation (3.2)).
13Values we chose for rqmin, rqmax, Pmin and Pmax are equal to -3, 0, 0, 0.35, respectively. On
the other hand, Nrprod and NP are equal to 200 and 40, respectively.
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3.2.3 Results
The properties of the simulated policy function are employed in order to inves-
tigate how oil production decisions are related to changes in demand and price
levels in the international oil markets. As a consequence, interesting properties
on the behaviour of oil production decisions can be studied. In particular, the
correlation of effective production with demand and prices and the rigidity of
decisions on extraction levels are examined in the next Subsection. A Kaplan-
Meier plot of hazard function is, hence, computed on simulated data and curves
representing the probability of increasing production in a given time interval are
plotted.
As far as the frequency of production changes is concerned, the percentage of
production increases and decreases are here examined together with the average
size of production changes. Tables 3.1 to 3.3 show how results vary as assump-
tions on key parameters (θ, ψ and γ) are changed.
[INSERT TABLES 3.1 TO 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
Results suggests that as θ increases, the frequency of production changes de-
creases. The frequency of production changes tends to vary also with oil pro-
ducers’ costs. As unit costs (denoted by parameter γ) or the multiplier associ-
ated to costs (ψ) increase, production becomes more rigid, that is, the frequency
of decisions on production levels decreases.
Tables 3.1 to 3.3 show that a similar relationship exists between the percentage
of production increases and the values assumed by the different parameters. In
particular, as values of key parameters increase, the fraction of upward adjust-
ment increases as well.
On the contrary, the cost structure that characterizes oil producing countries
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does not seem to affect the average size of production changes.
A higher percentage of output increases with respect to production decreases
suggests that asymmetric effects probably affect oil production decisions.14, 15
Since the possibility to change output levels is characterized by some rigidity,
production adjusts almost instantaneously to increases in world oil demand.
On the contrary, numerical simulations suggest that, in case of decreases in de-
mand, oil producing countries tend to reduce production more slowly.
Results on the correlation between production changes and world demand are
shown in Table 3.4 whereas the relationship between output levels and oil prices
is reported in Table 3.5.
[INSERT TABLES 3.4 AND 3.5 AND FIGURES 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
Statistics obtained by considering different values assigned to parameters θ, ψ
and γ suggest that oil output displays a higher correlation with demand than
with respect to prices. In addition, although correlation decreases when first-
differences of the series are employed, it still remains particularly high. A strong
correlation of oil production with world demand behavior is also shown in Fig-
ure 3.3. On the contrary, oil producing countries do not change significantly
output levels as a response to oil price shocks.
By employing simulated data, the following supply function are estimated and
14Of course, part of this effect is due to the positive trend that characterizes simulated data of
total world oil demand.
15This assumption is tested by means of an empirical model in Section 3.3.
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results shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7:16
(3.3) lnqt = β0 + β1lnDt + β2lnPt + t
and
(3.4) ∆lnqt = β0 + β1∆lnDt + β2∆lnPt + t
where qt denotes the total production at time t, Dt and Pt are total world oil
demand and the real price of oil, respectively. All variables are represented by
simulated data. βi (i = 0, 1, 2) represent the parameters to estimate while t
denote the error term of the regression. According to equation (3.4) all variables
are expressed in log first differences. This would allow us to obtain additional
evidence on the importance of the economic determinants of oil production lev-
els.
Even in this case different assumptions on parameters ψ, γ and θ are employed
to generate patterns that can be used to describe output levels for different oil
producers.
[INSERT TABLES 3.6 AND 3.7 ABOUT HERE]
Results reported in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 suggest that the elasticity of production
levels to world oil demand is positive and statistically significant if both equa-
tions in levels and in first-differences are considered. Viceversa, the relationship
between oil production and oil prices is argued to be much lower. Coefficients
obtained by estimating equation (3.5) are significantly different from zero in six
16These equations are simply an extension of the models employed by Griffin to test several
assumptions on the structure of the world oil market ([108] ).
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out of nine cases. Nevertheless, when the log-differences of the series are con-
sidered, in no case there exists an impact of oil prices on production levels.
Finally, a function which is often used to denote the probability that effective
production will change at time t given that it has remained stable for t periods
is represented by the Kaplan-Meier hazard function.17 Figure 3.4 depicts the
probability of adjustments in production levels as a consequence of changes in
conditions on the oil market.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.4 ABOUT HERE]
The Kaplan Meier plot of hazard function demonstrates that production adjusts
almost instantaneously to changes in the stance of world oil market. However,
the possibility that output levels are adjusted according to changes in world
oil demand tends to be affected by parameters representing the relative cost of
extraction of oil. In other words, the response of oil producing countries shocks
depends on the relative importance of marginal costs. Moreover, according to
the cost of adjustments oil producing countries have to face when they decide
to change production levels, the hazard function is assumed to take different
forms. In the presence of low costs of adjustment, the hazard function is upward
slopping. For some countries, the probability that production levels increase
tends to be higher the longer the output has remained stable.
17Let D be a random variable that denotes the duration of a production increase. The hazard
of the decision by oil producers to increase output is given by λ(t) = P (D = t|D ≥ t).
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3.3 An Empirical Analysis of Oil Production
3.3.1 Introduction
The data on oil production levels employed in our analysis are taken from the
Energy Information Administration dataset.18. Information on the period of
time considered for each country are given in Table 3.8. The countries we focus
in the present study are represented by relevant non-OPEC oil producers. Al-
though oil production is important for the economy of these countries, changes
in their production levels are not able to affect significantly oil prices in interna-
tional markets. For these countries, adjustments in production levels are often
difficult to implement and involves significant investments by foreign compa-
nies.
Data on oil production levels are reported also for manyOPEC countries, the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.19 Decisions on output levels for
these producers are often motivated by other factors. In fact, OPEC is able to re-
strict production to take advantage of its market share and determine important
18In our analysis, we employ data for the following 19 countries: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador,
Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, In-
donesia, Malysia, Mexico, Norway, Russia and the United States.
19Because of data availability, our dataset does not include oil production levels for Iraq, Qatar
and United Arab Emirates.
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increases in oil prices.20, 21
[INSERT TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE]
Simple descriptive statistics on the size of oil production for these countries are
shown in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. In Table 3.9 statistics are computed for the levels
of the series22 whereas in Table 3.10, the statistics above are shown for the log
first-difference of the variables.23 The first moments of the distribution (mean,
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) of oil production are reported in
columns two to five of the tables. The sixth column shows the degree of correla-
tion between oil production and demand. The relationship between oil produc-
tion and real oil prices is reported in column seven.24 The relationship between
oil production for the countries considered in this study has been examined.
Results from statistical analysis confirm that the degree of correlation of pro-
20Nevertheless, a problem OPEC often has to face is related to the cheating behaviour of some
members. They often try to benefit of higher prices in order to augment their profits. As a
consequnece, issues about the stability of the cartel often arise (see, for instance, [122]) and [109]).
21Supply function for OPEC member countries are estimated in order to allow us to compare
the responses by these producers to demand and price shocks with those by actors which are
assumed to behave indipendently.
22Oil production data are expressed in thousand barrels per day.
23The first difference of the variable yt is expressed as∆lnyt, where∆lnyt = lnyt − lnyt−1.
24Oil prices in national currencies are obtained by using the exchange rate of the US dollar
for each country. Real oil price levels are thus calculated by deflating the oil prices measured in
national currencies. At this purpose, the inflation indicator of each of the countries is employed.
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duction levels of non-OPEC countries is particularly low and rarely statistically
significant.25
[INSERT TABLES 3.9 AND 3.10 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3.9 and 3.10 show that production levels of OPEC countries have on aver-
age a higher correlationwithworld oil demand. This result may be due to higher
oil reserves and lower extraction costs. Production levels of Algeria are the most
correlated with demand whereas correlation of oil output levels from Angola
and Ecuador show lower levels of correlation. As far as non-OPEC countries are
concerned, results suggest a high correlation between production levels and oil
demand for the United States, Norway and Russia. Correlation between pro-
duction and oil prices tends to be particularly low for all countries considered
in the present study.
25Statistics are not reported to save space but are available upon request.
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3.3.2 The Empirical Analysis
In this Section we focus on the economic determinants of decisions on produc-
tion levels by oil producing countries. It is worth mentioning that our analysis
does not aim at giving a full description of factors that may affect decisions on
output levels by producing countries. Although other factors (such as the de-
gree of political instability, the measure of openness of the economy to foreign
investments, future expectations on extraction costs etc.)26 are able to influence
oil production, we have decided to concentrate on the effects that changes in
world oil demand and prices have on output levels. In other words, our pur-
pose is to answer to this simple question: how do oil production levels respond
to changes in the stance of world oil markets? The empirical methodology exam-
ined in the present study is based upon standard time-series econometric tech-
niques. In particular, for each country, the order of integration and cointegration
of the variables is examined and a dynamic econometric model is estimated on
the basis of the following algorithm.
1. The order of integration of oil production and real oil prices is consided.27
(a) if both series are stationary (that is, they are both I(0)) the following
26Since the aim of this paper is not to study the structure of the world oil market, we do not
consider as a determinant of decisions on output levels by OPEC countries the production levels
of other countries. The possibility to extend our analysis in order to include this assumption is
left as a topic for future research.
27Results from unit root tests suggest that world oil demand is not stationary (I(1)).
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equation is estimated:
(3.5) lnqit = α+
n∑
k=1
βklnqi,t−k +
n∑
j=0
γj∆lnDt−j +
n∑
s=0
ϑslnPi,t−s + t
where qit is total production for country i at time t, Dt and Pi,t are
total world oil demand and the real price of oil, respectively. βk (i =
0, 1, . . . , n), γj (j = 0, 1, . . . , n) and ϑs (s = 0, 1, . . . , n) represent the
parameters to estimate while t denotes the error term of the regres-
sion. All variables considered are in natural logarithms.
(b) if the production level is I(0) while the price level is I(1), the follow-
ing equation is estimated:
(3.6) lnqit = α+
n∑
k=1
βklnqi,t−k +
n∑
j=0
γj∆lnDt−j +
n∑
s=0
ϑs∆lnPi,t−s + t
(c) on the contrary, if only the price level is I(0), the expression to esti-
mate takes the following form:
(3.7) ∆lnqit = α+
n∑
k=1
βk∆lnqi,t−k+
n∑
j=0
γj∆lnDt−j+
n∑
s=0
ϑslnPi,t−s+t
(d) if both series are integrated then the step 2 has to be considered;
2. Tests for the presence of cointegration are implemented. Let us consider
the following equation:
(3.8) lnqit = a0 + a1lnDt + a2lnPt + νt
where ai (i = 0, 1, 2) and νtdenote parameters to estimate and the error
term, respectively. It is worth noticing that OLS regressions of world oil
production on total demand and prices yield superconsistent estimates of
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these coefficients. This equation represents the long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship between oil production, world oil demand and oil prices. If the
long-run disequilibrium between world oil production, world oil produc-
tion and prices (νt) follows a stationary process, it can be said that the three
series are cointegrated. According to the results on the stationary of of νt
one of the following two results has to be considered.
(a) If series are not cointegrated (that is, the relationship representing the
long run equilibrium between the series is no stationary) the follow-
ing AutoRegressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL(n)) of order n has
to be estimated:
(3.9) ∆lnqit = α+
n∑
k=1
βk∆lnqi,t−k+
n∑
j=0
γj∆lnDt−j+
n∑
s=0
ϑs∆lnPi,t−s+t
(b) if oil production is cointegrated with world oil demand and oil prices,
the specification to estimate is represented by the following Error Cor-
rection Model (ECM):
(3.10)
∆lnqit = α+
n∑
k=1
βk∆lnqi,t−k+
n∑
j=0
γj∆lnDt−j+
n∑
s=0
ϑs∆lnPi,t−s+θECTt−1+t
here θ represents the long-run equilibrium adjustment parameter while
ECTt−1 = νt−1 denotes the long-run equilibrium relationship between
oil production, world oil demand and crude oil prices.
Finally, tests are introduced to examine the hypothesis of asymmetric effects of
increases and decreases of world oil demand and real oil prices on oil produc-
tion levels. In fact, for instance, [111] suggest that, among the OPEC countries,
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short-run effects of price changes on production tend to be asymmetric.28 The
modified versions of equations (3.6) to (3.10) employed in order to test the as-
sumption of asymmetric effects are given in Table 3.11.
[INSERT TABLE 3.11 ABOUT HERE]
In this Table, ∆lny+t−j and ∆lny
(−)
t−j denote, respectively, increases and decreases
of variable yt−j (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) where yt = {Dt, Pi,t} whereas ECT (+)t−1 (ECT (−)t−1 )
indicates the positive (negative) component of the error correction term.
3.3.3 The Results
Data for total world oil demand and oil prices are taken from the EIA and Inter-
national Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund, IFS, IMF) databases,
respectively. The IFS dataset provides us also with the economic data for the
nineteen countries examined in this study. The equation chosen between the
five alternative specifications is estimated over monthly data. The sample size
considered for each country is given in Table 3.8.
Results obtained from unit-root tests for relevant variables considered in the
present study are reported in Tables 3.12 to 3.13. The problem of testing the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity versus stationary is solved by employing Aug-
mented Dickey Fuller tests (see [123]). The following equation is, thus, esti-
mated:
(3.11) ∆ ln yt = α+ α1 · trend+ α2lnyt−1 +
p∑
i=1
βi∆ ln yt−i + t
28According to these authors, for instance, in Saudi Arabia “price reductions lower production
faster than price increases raise production”.
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where yt and t are the variable being tested and the residual, respectively. The
test is implemented by determining the t-statistic of α̂2 and comparing the value
of this statistic with critical values computed by [124]. 29
[INSERT TABLES 3.12 AND 3.13 ABOUT HERE]
Results suggest that, in general, oil production is a variable integrated of order
one (I(1)). Nevertheless, production levels of Nigeria, Venezuela, Brazil, Canada
and the United States seem to be stationary around a trend. With the relevant
exception of Angola, tests of unit-root implemented on variables representing
real oil prices suggest that these variables are not stationary.
Tables 3.14 shows the results obtained from the estimation of the long-run rela-
tionship between oil production, world oil demand and real oil prices. In Table
3.15 results of tests implemented in order to test the stationarity of the residuals
of the long-run relationship are presented. At this purpose, critical values for
the ADF tests are based upon [127].
[INSERT TABLES 3.14 AND 3.15 ABOUT HERE]
Stationary tests implemented on the residuals of long-run relationship suggest
that, only for Malaysia there is a cointegrating relationship between oil produc-
tion, world oil demand and oil prices.
Equations representing the short-run dynamics of oil production decisions are
29If the trend is not significant, equation 3.11 is re-estimated without trend (α1 ≡ 0). Following
[125], the number of lags to include in the regression is chosen by minimizing the Schwarz-
Bayesian Information Criterion. For an analysis of the testing procedure adopted in this paper,
see [126]).
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estimated for relevant oil producing countries and results shown in Tables 3.16
to 3.18.30, 31 Table 3.19 shows the statistical significance of the overall impact of
world oil demand and prices on total output. In particular, simple statistical
tests of the hypothesis that all regression coefficients associated with exogenous
variables are zero are reported together with the sign of the relationship between
oil production and total demand (or real oil prices).32, 33
[INSERT TABLES 3.16 TO 3.19 ABOUT HERE]
Estimation of equation (3.5) to (3.10 yields important insights as far as the rela-
tionship between production decisions and developments in world oil market
is concerned. Many countries display a significant relationship between their
production levels and world oil demand. This is particularly true for OPEC
member countries like Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. On the contrary for An-
gola, Ecuador, Libya and Venezuela coefficients associated to world oil demand
are not statistically different from zero. This relationship is confirmed for many
30These tables report coefficients estimates with standard errors. Statistics which describe the
goodness of fit of regressions are also reported.
31Following [128] inter alia, the optimal lag-length of ARDL and EC Models is selected on the
basis of the Akaike Information Criterion and all models checked for misspecification. All these
results are available from the author upon request.
32According to these tests, the null hypotheses H0 : γ1 = γ2 = . . . = γn = 0 and H0 : ϑ1 =
ϑ2 = . . . = ϑn = 0 are, respectively, considered in order to evaluate the joint significance of
parameters on world oil demand and real oil prices.
33This information is reported only when the relationship between the two variables is statis-
tically relevant.
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non-OPEC countries. In particular, a strong positive relationship between oil
production and world oil demand exists for Norway and the United States. An
explanation for this evidence lies in the fact that, in presence of economic growth
and, consequently, increases in national demand for oil, these countries have in-
centive to extract more oil from their oil fields. Finally, according to Tables 3.16
and 3.17 (and, often, because of a lack of flexibility) oil production tend to adjust
not instantaneously but after a certain lag.
On the contrary, the effect of oil prices on oil production decisions seems to be
much lower. Many OPEC countries are characterized by an elasticity to price
changes not statistically different from zero. Noticeable exceptions are repre-
sented by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In these countries, in fact, oil production
tend to increase in presence of positive oil price shocks. A likely explanation is
that, these oil producers are likely to increase production in an attempt to reduce
pressures of growth in oil demand on prices.34 However, if non-OPEC countries
are considered, only in Russia oil production tend to change in the presence of
real oil price shocks.
In Tables 3.20 to3.22 results of statistical evidence aimed at testing the assump-
tion of asymmetric effects of world oil demand and oil prices on output levels
are reported.
[INSERT TABLES 3.20 TO 3.22 ABOUT HERE]
According to the results, nonlinear responses of total output to changes in oil de-
mand are valid for Algeria, Russia and Venezuela. For these countries, produc-
tion responses are more rapid in the presence of increases in total oil demand.
34Remember that these countries are characterized by higher levels of spare capacity.
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On the contrary, when total oil demand declines, oil production levels either do
not change or increase. For Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Norway, responses
of national output are stronger in the presence of increases in demand levels.
However, the hypothesis of symmetric effects to demand changes cannot be re-
jected at any significance level.
With regard to the effects of real oil price increases and decreases, the most
straighforward evidence that results from Table 3.21 is that, for the United States,
production increases in response to both price increases and declines. Moreover,
Table 3.20 shows that for Malaysia the estimation of Error Correction Models al-
lows us to argue that there exist nonlinear responses of oil production levels to
disequilibrium in the supply function as represented by the long-run relation-
ship (3.8).
Finally, the Kaplan-Meier hazard function is determined by employing actual
data for both OPEC and non-OPEC countries. According to the results shown
in Figure 3.5 a similar pattern of the hazard probability characterizes many oil
producing countries.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.5 ABOUT HERE]
The probability of an increase of output levels after they have remained stable
for a long period is argued to be particularly high for all producing countries.
After it reaches its maximum at the second month, it begins decreasing. Results
support the relatively rapid adjustment of production to factors affecting the
external environment.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
According to the economic theory, the world oil market can be said to be domi-
nated by a cartel of oil producers (OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries) while a set of non-OPEC producing countries represent the “compet-
itive fringe” of the market (see, inter alia, [104]).
Our analysis focuses on the decisions on production levels faced by these latter
countries. Because of the size of their oil reserves, these actors of the world oil
market are characterized by relatively low production levels. In addition, they
are assumed to take prices as exogenously given. In other words, output lev-
els for these producing countries are too low to affect oil prices on international
markets.
This paper aims at studying the behavior of these countries under assumptions
regarding the stance of world oil markets. In particular, it aims at establishing
how oil production levels react to changes in world oil demand and prices. Al-
though previous research has already considered the determinants of decisions
on oil production levels, relatively few studies have examined the elasticity of
these decisions to changes in the stance of world oil markets. This paper tries to
fill the gap in our understanding of the relationship between oil production lev-
els, world oil demand and real oil prices. At this purpose, both theoretical and
empirical models are designed to describe the decisions on production levels of
these actors of world oil market. The implications of our results with regard to
the effects on the overall structure of the markets are, hence, discussed.
According to the calibration and simulation of our theoretical model, decisions
on output levels by oil producers are argued to depend on their cost structure.
Results from numerical simulation of the model suggest that production levels
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respond rapidly to changes in the stance of world oil market. In addition, differ-
ent responses to changes in world oil demand and real oil prices characterize the
decisions on production levels. In other words, on the one hand, decisions on
output levels by several exporting countries are significantly affected by changes
in world oil demand. On the contrary, the behaviour of simulated series sug-
gests that the responses of oil exporting countries to changes in real oil prices
are less important. Finally, an upward sloping Kaplan-Meier hazard function is
introduced to describe oil production decisions for many countries.
Empirical models based on standard time-series econometric techniques are in-
troduced to describe data regarding output levels for a significant sample of oil
producers. Results from the estimation of ARDL (AutoRegresssive Distributive
Lag) and EC (Error Correction) models suggest that production levels tend to
adjust significantly to changes in world oil demand. On the contrary, statistical
tests do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of no effects from oil price changes
to oil production levels. This latter result underlines the possibility that adjust-
ments of production levels is constrained by the fact that, in many small oil pro-
ducing countries, the oil sector is characterized by low levels of spare capacity.
As a consequence, production responds to oil price changes only with a certain
lag.
Finally, the hypothesis of asymmetric effects of increases and decreases of world
oil demand and real oil prices on oil production levels is examined and dis-
cussed. Nonlinear responses of total output to changes in oil demand for Al-
geria, Russia and Venezuela suggest that, in these countries, production levels
responds more rapidly to increases with respect to decrease of total oil demand.
As an interesting avenue for future research the theoretical model considered
in this paper can be extended in order to describe the behavior of the Organi-
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zation of exporting countries. In particular, decisions on production levels and
changes in world oil demand could be modelled by introducing the possibility
that decisions on production quotas may affect prices in the world oil market.
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Figure 3.1: Profit Function of an Oil Producing Country
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Figure 3.2: Value and Policy Function
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Figure 3.3: Responses of Oil Production to Changes in the World Oil Market 
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Figure 3.4: Hazard function of Oil Production Changes (Simulated Data)
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Figure 3.5: Hazard function of Oil Production Changes (estimation)
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Table 3.1: Simulation results. Statistics on oil production changes. Changes in θ.
θ Frequency Fraction up Fraction down Average size
2.75 8.371 60.992% 40.008 % 7.100
3.00 7.808 62.489% 37.511 % 7.123
3.25 7.664 65.615 % 34.385 % 6.574
Table 3.2: Simulation results. Statistics on oil production changes. Changes in γ.
γ Frequency Fraction up Fraction down Average size
0.4 9.583 58.810% 41.190% 6.851
0.5 7.765 62.503% 37.497% 7.102
0.6 6.948 64.060% 35.940% 6.658
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Table 3.3: Simulation results. Statistics on oil production changes. Changes in ψ.
ψ Frequency Fraction up Fraction down Average size
0.025 8.394 60.723% 39.277% 7.054
0.03 7.766 62.052% 37.948% 7.163
0.035 7.386 62.740 % 37.260% 7.214
Table 3.4: Correlation between production levels and world oil demand. Simu-
lation data.
θ Levels First Differences
2.5 79.1% 17.9%
3 79.9% 1.4%
3.5 95.9% 20.0%
γ Levels First Differences
0.4 79.8% 36.8%
0.5 95.3% 26.9%
0.6 88.4% 15.1%
ψ Levels First Differences
0.025 92.2% 20.1%
0.03 92.7% 25.3%
0.035 22.7% 16.2%
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Table 3.5: Correlation between production levels and oil prices. Simulation data.
θ Levels First Differences
2.5 41.9% 1.2%
3 50.1% -14.2%
3.5 1.4% -10.0%
γ Levels First Differences
0.4 26.9% -8.6%
0.5 23.9% 9.6%
0.6 -58.2% -16.0%
ψ Levels First Differences
0.025 -60.7% 7.4%
0.03 21.5% 1.3%
0.035 14.2% -3.6%
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Table 3.6: Statistical relationship between production levels, world oil demand
and oil prices. Simulated data - Levels.
Demand Prices
θ Coeff St. Error Coeff St.Error
2.5 1.114 0.071 *** 0.004 0.008
3 0.385 0.027 *** 0.021 0.006 ***
3.5 0.972 0.021 *** 0.004 0.010
γ Coeff St. Error Coeff St.Error
0.4 1.016 0.056 *** -0.017 0.007
0.5 0.969 0.021 *** 0.029 0.007 ***
0.6 1.121 0.049 *** 0.113 0.015 ***
ψ Coeff St. Error Coeff St.Error
0.025 1.548 0.075 *** 0.042 0.006 ***
0.03 1.078 0.030 *** 0.016 0.006 ***
0.035 0.281 0.085 *** 0.019 0.010 *
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Table 3.7: Statistical relationship between production levels, world oil demand
and oil prices. Simulated data - First Differences.
Demand Prices
θ Coeff St. Error Coeff St.Error
2.5 0.410 0.164 *** 0.003 0.015
3 0.002 0.068 -0.028 0.014
3.5 0.391 0.149 *** -0.014 0.014
γ Coeff St. Error Coeff St.Error
0.4 0.926 0.169 *** -0.023 0.017
0.5 0.608 0.160 *** 0.018 0.016
0.6 0.140 0.069 ** -0.015 0.007
ψ Coeff St. Error Coeff St.Error
0.025 0.394 0.134 *** 0.016 0.013
0.03 0.561 0.155 *** 0.005 0.015
0.04 0.36 0.16 ** -0.009 0.019
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Table 3.8: Countries considered in the empirical analysis
Country Start Date End Date N. Observations
Algeria January 1994 January 2010 193
Angola November 1995 January 2010 171
Ecuador January 1994 January 2010 193
Iran January 1994 January 2010 193
Kuwait January 1994 February 2009 182
Libya January 2001 November 2009 107
Nigeria January 1994 October 2009 190
Saudi Arabia January 1994 January 2010 193
Venezuela January 1994 January 2010 193
Brazil January 1996 January 2010 169
Canada January 1994 January 2010 193
Colombia January 1994 January 2010 193
Egypt January 1994 January 2009 186
Indonesia January 1994 January 2010 193
Malaysia January 1994 January 2010 193
Mexico January 1994 January 2010 193
Norway January 1994 January 2010 193
Russia June 1995 January 2010 176
U.S. January 1994 January 2010 193
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Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics of Oil Producing Countries. Levels.
Correlation with:
Country Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis a) demand b) prices
Algeria 1718.7 336.2 0.25 -1.71 94.3% 87.9%
Angola 1058.2 478.6 0.99 -0.47 83.8% 21.9%
Ecuador 438.7 65.4 0.41 -1.45 85.2% -36.1%
Iran 3875.5 240.1 0.11 -1.24 81.8% 73.3%
Kuwait 2317.7 248.3 0.40 -1.32 84.7% 86.1%
Libya 1564.3 177.4 0.67 -1.14 83.4% 88.4%
Nigeria 2210.5 190.5 0.40 0.53 74.1% 56.1%
Saudi Arabia 9745.5 752.1 0.45 -0.94 78.1% 75.7%
Venezuela 2971.1 398.1 -1.46 7.15 -38.3% -45.8%
Brazil 1673.4 529.2 0.08 -1.11 94.0% 82.2%
Canada 2904.6 347.3 0.04 -1.15 93.6% 78.4%
Colombia 619.1 94.7 0.61 0.03 -14.2% -36.4%
Egypt 769.9 108.9 0.03 -1.21 -93.2% -78.4%
Indonesia 1354.2 233.3 -0.16 -1.64 -91.2% -81.1%
Malaysia 758.2 54.9 0.27 -0.64 8.6% -22.0%
Mexico 3452.1 277.7 -0.37 0.32 35.7% -7.9%
Norway 3007.2 369.42 -0.50 -0.80 -34.5% -55.2%
Russia 7831.0 1590.2 0.17 -1.74 92.6% 69.4%
U.S. 8950.7 452.2 -1.04 2.31 -71.5% -58.4%
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Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics of Oil Producing Countries. First differences.
Correlation with:
Country Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis a) demand b) prices
Algeria 0.26% 1.10% 0.83 4.02 18.5% -7.85%
Angola 0.74% 2.68% 0.83 4.37 2.2% -0.72%
Ecuador 0.14% 3.72% 0.78 10.94 5.4% 0.30%
Iran 0.07% 2.17% -0.35 2.73 25.9% -0.76%
Kuwait 0.10% 1.99% -0.71 11.63 24.0% -12.50%
Libya 0.12% 1.12% -0.15 5.37 21.6% -7.43%
Nigeria 0.09% 4.10% -0.18 6.17 16.4% 3.18%
Saudi Arabia 0.05% 1.95% 0.60 8.12 50.5% 5.92%
Venezuela -0.09% 11.22% -2.85 66.75 28.5% -12.32%
Brazil 0.56% 5.94% -0.04 57.40 -6.4% -4.74%
Canada 0.20% 2.79% 0.15 0.03 15.4% -0.11%
Colombia 0.25% 4.13% -0.76 9.44 -3.7% 4.30%
Egypt -0.23% 1.96% -1.89 9.58 -3.5% 9.93%
Indonesia -0.23% 1.09% 0.51 4.27 3.1% -5.85%
Malaysia 0.01% 2.66% -0.10 4.26 -3.0% -1.08%
Mexico -0.03% 4.37% -1.18 29.45 15.1% 6.01%
Norway -0.05% 6.34% -0.12 1.16 43.9% -10.43%
Russia 0.21% 1.00% -0.58 2.03 17.1% 7.67%
U.S. -0.01% 2.82% -2.06 22.88 28.5% -3.23%
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Table 3.11: Models employed in order to test asymmetric effects of world oil
demand and real oil prices on oil production levels.
Model Symmetric Effects
1b lnqit = α+
∑n
k=1 βklnqi,t−k +
∑n
j=0 γj∆lnDt−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑs∆lnPi,t−s + t
1c ∆lnqit = α+
∑n
k=1 βk∆lnqi,t−k +
∑n
j=0 γj∆lnDt−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑslnPi,t−s + t
2a ∆lnqit = α+
∑n
k=1 βk∆lnqi,t−k +
∑n
j=0 γj∆lnDt−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑs∆lnPi,t−s + t
2b ∆lnqit = α+
∑n
k=1 βk∆lnqi,t−k +
∑n
j=0 γj∆lnDt−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑs∆lnPi,t−s+
+θECTt−1 + t
Model Asymmetric Effects
1b lnqit = α+
∑n
k=1 βklnqi,t−k +
∑n
j=0 γ
(+)
j ∆lnD
(+)
t−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑ
(+)
s ∆lnP
(+)
i,t−s+
+
∑n
j=0 γ
(−)
j ∆lnD
(−)
t−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑ
(−)
s ∆lnP
(−)
i,t−s + t
1c ∆lnqit = α+
∑n
k=1 βk∆lnqi,t−k +
∑n
j=0 γ
(+)
j ∆lnD
(+)
t−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑslnPi,t−s+
+
∑n
j=0 γ
(−)
j ∆lnD
(−)
t−j + t
2a ∆lnqit = α+
∑n
k=1 βk∆lnqi,t−k +
∑n
j=0 γ
(+)
j ∆lnD
(+)
t−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑ
(+)
s ∆lnP
(+)
i,t−s+
+
∑n
j=0 γ
(−)
j ∆lnD
(−)
t−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑ
(−)
s ∆lnP
(−)
i,t−s + t
2b ∆lnqit = α+
∑n
k=1 βk∆lnqi,t−k +
∑n
j=0 γ
(+)
j ∆lnD
(+)
t−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑ
(+)
s ∆lnP
(+)
i,t−s+
+θ(+)ECT (+)t−1 +
∑n
j=0 γ
(−)
j ∆lnD
(−)
t−j +
∑n
s=0 ϑ
(−)
s ∆lnP
(−)
i,t−s + θ
(−)ECT (−)t−1 + t
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Table 3.12: Results of unit root tests. Production and world oil demand.
Levels First Differences
Country N. Lags T-Stat. Prob. N. Lags T-Stat. Prob.
Algeria 0 -0.29 0.922 0 -11.609 0.000***
Angola 1t -1.58 0.797 0 -11.718 0.00 ***
Ecuador 1 -1.71 0.423 0 -17.780 0.000***
Iran 1t -2.93 0.156 0 -18.107 0.000***
Kuwait 1t -2.45 0.353 0 -11.584 0.000***
Libya 0 -0.41 0.905 0 -11.965 0.000***
Nigeria 0t -4.49 0.002*** 1 -13.398 0.000***
Saudi Arabia 1 -2.21 0.205 0 -11.694 0.000***
Venezuela 4t -4.03 0.009*** 3 -10.626 0.000***
Brazil 1t -4.63 0.001*** 2 -11.838 0.000***
Canada 0t -5.62 0.000*** 1 -13.815 0.000***
Colombia 0 -2.11 0.241 0 -15.722 0.000***
Egypt 0 -0.24 0.930 0 -14.269 0.000***
Indonesia 0t -2.40 0.378 0 -14.974 0.000***
Malaysia 0 -2.68 0.080* 0 -14.815 0.000***
Mexico 2 -1.70 0.429 2 -12.251 0.000***
Norway 12t -1.63 0.778 11t -5.927 0.000***
Russia 0t -2.97 0.144 0 -15.954 0.000***
U.S. 0t -5.11 0.000*** 1 -13.637 0.000***
Oil Demand 0t -2.86 0.178 1 -12.220 0.000***
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Table 3.13: Results of unit root tests. Real oil prices.
Levels First Differences
Country N. Lags T-Stat. Prob. N. Lags T-Stat. Prob.
Algeria 1t -3.174 0.093* 0 -10.881 0.000***
Angola 2 -3.310 0.016** 0 -11.213 0.000***
Ecuador 1 -1.781 0.389 0 -10.447 0.000***
Iran 0t -2.201 0.486 0 -12.218 0.000***
Kuwait 1t -2.393 0.382 0 -10.407 0.000***
Libya 1 -2.208 0.205 0 -8.339 0.000***
Nigeria 0t -2.229 0.471 0 -13.428 0.000***
Saudi Arabia 1t -2.850 0.181 0 -10.691 0.000***
Venezuela 1 -1.936 0.316 0 -10.379 0.000***
Brazil 1 -1.682 0.439 0 -10.788 0.000***
Canada 1t -3.278 0.073* 0 -11.447 0.000***
Colombia 1t -2.898 0.166 0 -11.478 0.000***
Egypt 1t -2.469 0.343 0 -10.370 0.000***
Indonesia 0 -2.979 0.141 0 -12.317 0.000***
Malaysia 1t -3.427 0.051* 0 -11.060 0.000***
Mexico 1t -2.761 0.214 0 -11.391 0.000***
Norway 1t -3.025 0.128 0 -11.418 0.000***
Russia 1t -2.781 0.207 0 -11.083 0.000***
U.S. 1t -2.825 0.190 0 -10.828 0.000***
150
Table 3.14: Estimates of long-run relationship between oil production, world oil
demand and real oil prices.
Constant Demand Prices
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. R2
Algeria -13.964 1.246*** 1.824 0.119*** 0.110 0.015*** 91.48%
Ecuador -19.119 0.983*** 2.206 0.085*** 0.080 0.009*** 79.49%
Iran 1.927 0.506*** 0.538 0.048*** 0.022 0.004*** 68.60%
Kuwait 0.651 1.118 0.607 0.102*** 0.114 0.015*** 76.13%
Libya -16.583 2.159*** 2.105 0.194*** 0.042 0.012*** 87.67%
Saudi Arabia 3.702 1.034*** 0.465 0.096*** 0.052 0.012*** 63.05%
Colombia -9.607 2.418*** 1.732 0.242*** -0.311 0.033*** 32.25%
Egypt 23.804 1.038*** -1.505 0.096*** -0.040 0.011*** 86.40%
Indonesia 33.551 1.971*** -2.352 0.202*** 0.012 0.027 81.29%
Malaysia -8.696 1.703*** 1.435 0.159*** -0.178 0.020*** 31.07%
Mexico -3.836 1.151*** 1.139 0.109*** -0.142 0.017*** 36.53%
Norway 3.213 2.355 0.523 0.223** -0.204 0.034*** 25.07%
Russia -24.769 1.258*** 2.971 0.120*** 0.032 0.019* 89.63%
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Table 3.15: Stationary analysis of residuals of long-run relationship.
Country N. Lags T-Stat.
Algeria 0 -2.916
Ecuador 1 -3.096
Iran 1 -3.364*
Kuwait 0 -3.077
Libya 0 -3.090
Saudi Arabia 0 -2.601
Colombia 0 -2.952
Egypt 0 -2.768
Indonesia 0 -2.325
Malaysia 0 -3.847**
Mexico 2 -2.210
Norway 2 -2.080
Russia 0 -3.464*
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Table 3.16: Estimation of oil production levels. Short-run dynamics.
Algeria Ecuador Iran Kuwait Libya Saudi Arabia
C 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 *
∆logqi,t−1 0.137 -0.265 -0.347 0.060 0.083 0.074
0.075 * 0.071 *** 0.075 *** 0.073 0.100 0.074
∆logqi,t−2 -0.019 -0.285 -0.100 -0.071
0.073 0.077 *** 0.072 0.074
∆logqi,t−3 0.158 -0.096 -0.119
0.072 ** 0.079 0.073
∆logqi,t−4 -0.234
0.077 ***
∆logqi,t−5 0.109
0.074
∆logqi,t−6
∆logDt 0.234 0.368 0.611 0.589 0.174 1.090
0.094 ** 0.315 0.174 *** 0.171 *** 0.148 0.149 ***
∆logDt−1 -0.041 0.283 0.435 0.480 -0.111 0.062
0.096 0.313 0.181 ** 0.169 *** 0.142 0.169
∆logDt−2 0.182 0.428 0.362 0.184
0.096 * 0.187 ** 0.176 ** 0.170
∆logDt−3 -0.043 0.432 0.252
0.096 0.188 ** 0.169
∆logDt−4 0.420
0.186 **
∆logDt−5 0.274
0.185
∆logDt−6
∆lnPi,t -0.012 -0.011 0.000 -0.037 -0.010 -0.003
0.009 0.031 0.010 0.017 ** 0.010 0.014
∆lnPi,t−1 -0.005 0.064 0.004 0.022 0.018 0.035
0.009 0.031 ** 0.010 0.017 0.010 * 0.014 **
∆lnPi,t−2 0.022 0.005 0.066 0.038
0.009 ** 0.010 0.017 *** 0.015 **
∆lnPi,t−3 0.015 0.002 0.031
0.009 * 0.010 0.015 **
∆lnPi,t−4 0.009
0.010
∆lnPi,t−5 0.011
0.010
∆lnPi,t−6
ECTt−1
trend
R2 17.08% 9.51% 29.01% 25.13% 7.78% 37.33%
Log-Lik. 601.59 367.25 484.51 467.11 315.84 519.55
AIC -6.24 -3.78 -4.99 -5.12 -5.90 -5.37
153
Table 3.17: Estimation of oil production levels. Short-run dynamics (Ctd.)
Colombia Egypt Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Norway Russia
C 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 0.002
0.003 0.002 * 0.001 *** 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001 **
∆lnqi,t−1 -0.049 -0.028 -0.087 -0.020 -0.531 -0.485 -0.078
0.076 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.075 *** 0.072 *** 0.079
∆lnqi,t−1 -0.029 -0.103 -0.433 -0.298 0.161
0.074 0.074 0.083 *** 0.072 *** 0.078 **
∆lnqi,t−1 -0.104 -0.212 0.141
0.068 0.083 ** 0.076 *
∆lnqi,t−1 -0.054 -0.084 0.141
0.067 0.073 0.076 *
∆lnqi,t−1 0.025 0.039
0.068 0.077
∆lnqi,t−1 0.180
0.067 ***
∆lnDt 0.086 -0.138 0.048 0.040 0.966 2.788 0.095
0.337 0.181 0.097 0.234 0.341 *** 0.463 *** 0.077
∆lnDt−1 0.477 -0.302 -0.016 0.213 -0.033 0.465 -0.216
0.334 0.175 * 0.096 0.230 0.349 0.496 0.077 ***
∆lnDt−2 0.067 0.200 0.420 0.717 -0.088
0.342 0.179 0.355 0.500 0.079
∆lnDt−3 -0.533 -0.363 -0.093
0.339 0.343 0.079
∆lnDt−4 -0.185 0.900 0.028
0.341 0.341 *** 0.077
∆lnDt−5 0.178 0.090
0.332 0.074
∆lnDt−6 -0.353
0.326
∆lnPi,t 0.029 0.021 -0.007 -0.003 0.015 -0.139 0.006
0.031 0.017 0.008 0.024 0.032 0.048 *** 0.007
∆lnPi,t−1 -0.003 -0.005 0.007 0.007 -0.086 -0.020 0.005
0.031 0.018 0.008 0.024 0.033 *** 0.049 0.007
∆lnPi,t−2 -0.038 0.037 -0.019 0.006 -0.002
0.032 0.018 ** 0.034 0.048 0.007
∆lnPi,t−3 0.023 0.045 0.022
0.032 0.034 0.007 ***
∆lnPi,t−4 0.000 0.007 -0.004
0.032 0.033 0.007
∆lnPi,t−5 -0.034 -0.006
0.031 0.007
∆lnPi,t−6 -0.005
0.032
ECTt−1 -0.086
0.035 **
trend
R2 12.11% 6.98% 1.74% 4.22% 34.46% 38.59% 17.95%
Log-Lik. 368.48 463.09 593.36 426.30 360.25 300.54 593.35
AIC -3.74 -4.96 -6.15 -4.39 -3.67 -3.07 -6.77
154
Table 3.18: Estimation of oil production levels. Short-run dynamics (Ctd.)
Angola Nigeria Venezuela Brazil Canada U.S.
C -0.017 C 1.410 2.681 1.086 2.050 2.358
0.041 0.328 *** 0.217 *** 0.294 *** 0.470 *** 0.456 ***
∆lnqi,t−1 0.190 lnqi,t−1 0.814 0.596 0.842 0.776 0.742
0.077 ** 0.043 *** 0.044 *** 0.043 *** 0.075 *** 0.050 ***
∆lnqi,t−2 lnqi,t−2 -0.092 -0.210
0.066 0.092 **
∆lnqi,t−3 lnqi,t−3 0.020 0.171
0.068 0.073 **
∆lnqi,t−4 lnqi,t−4 0.083
0.066
∆lnqi,t−5 lnqi,t−5 -0.037
0.057
∆lnqi,t−6 lnqi,t−6 0.102
0.035 ***
∆lnDt 0.191 ∆lnDt 0.772 0.874 0.062 0.521 0.900
0.248 0.342 ** 0.363 ** 0.252 0.228 ** 0.223 ***
∆lnDt−1 -0.104 ∆lnDt−1 0.035 0.322 -0.107 0.188 0.437
0.248 0.342 0.363 0.251 0.232 0.224 *
∆lnDt−2 ∆lnDt−2 -0.119 -0.090 -0.003
0.368 0.230 0.023
∆lnDt−3 ∆lnDt−3 0.395 -0.091
0.366 0.227
∆lnDt−4 ∆lnDt−4 0.631
0.365 *
∆lnDt−5 ∆lnDt−5 0.464
0.359
∆lnDt−6 ∆lnDt−6 0.346
0.351
lnPi,t 0.001 ∆lnPi,t 0.010 -0.020 -0.005 -0.019 0.009
0.012 0.021 0.030 0.024 0.024 0.023
lnPi,t−1 0.002 ∆lnPi,t−1 -0.029 -0.007 0.006 0.004
0.012 0.021 0.031 0.024 0.024
lnPi,t−2 ∆lnPi,t−2 0.003 -0.064
0.031 0.024 ***
lnPi,t−3 ∆lnPi,t−3 -0.018 0.031
0.031 0.024
lnPi,t−4 ∆lnPi,t−4 0.020
0.031
lnPi,t−5 ∆lnPi,t−5 0.004
0.031
lnPi,t−6 ∆lnPi,t−6 0.012
0.031
ECTt−1 ECTt−1
trend trend 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0009 0.0005 -0.0001
0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0000 ***
R2 4.29% R2 79.71% 95.90% 99.04% 95.69% 76.74%
Log-Lik. 375.40 Log Lik. 345.79 358.76 367.00 434.77 432.80
AIC -4.35 Akaike info criterion -3.60 -3.61 -4.31 -4.46 -4.46
155
Table 3.19: Estimation of oil production levels.
Demand Prices
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. Sign F-Stat. Prob. Sign
Algeria 3 2.330 0.058 * (+) 3.115 0.017 ** (+)
Angola 1 0.404 0.668 - 0.152 0.859 -
Ecuador 1 1.015 0.364 - 2.091 0.126 -
Iran 5 4.316 0.000 *** (+) 0.465 0.833 -
Kuwait 2 6.059 0.001 *** (+) 7.659 0.000 *** (+)
Libya 1 1.135 0.325 - 1.697 0.189 -
Nigeria 1 2.350 0.098 * (+) 0.991 0.373 -
Saudi Arabia 3 14.667 0.000 *** (+) 5.910 0.000 *** (+)
Venezuela 6 1.729 0.106 - 0.239 0.975 -
Brazil 1 0.126 0.881 - 0.048 0.953 -
Canada 3 1.672 0.159 - 2.211 0.0696 * (-)
Colombia 6 1.142 0.340 - 0.605 0.726 -
Egypt 2 1.797 0.150 - 1.998 0.116 -
Indonesia 1 0.144 0.866 - 0.780 0.460 -
Malaysia 1 0.435 0.648 - 0.047 0.954 -
Mexico 4 2.297 0.047 ** (+) 1.930 0.092 * (-)
Norway 2 12.369 0.000 *** (+) 2.989 0.032 ** (-)
Russia 5 2.238 0.042 ** (-) 2.172 0.049 ** (+)
U.S. 1 9.546 0.000 *** (+) 0.079 0.924 -
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Table 3.20: Asymmetric effects of world oil demand on oil production.
∆lnD(+)t ∆lnD
(−)
t γ
(+) =
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) γ(−) Prob.
Algeria 2 2.511 0.060 * (+) 0.834 0.477 2.836 0.094 *
Angola 1 0.764 0.468 0.647 0.525 - -
Ecuador 1 0.384 0.682 0.320 0.726 - -
Iran 4 2.752 0.021 ** (+) 2.237 0.053 * (+) 0.104 0.747
Kuwait 2 3.435 0.018 ** (+) 1.238 0.298 0.243 0.623
Libya 1 1.325 0.271 1.790 0.173 - -
Nigeria 1 1.350 0.262 0.328 0.721 - -
Saudi Arabia 2 11.258 0.000 *** (+) 3.833 0.011 ** (+) 0.482 0.488
Venezuela 4 4.341 0.001 *** (+) 0.950 0.451 14.575 0.000 ***
Brazil 1 1.904 0.153 0.869 0.421 - -
Canada 2 0.796 0.498 0.600 0.616 - -
Colombia 4 1.144 0.339 0.471 0.797 - -
Egypt 1 0.850 0.429 0.521 0.595 - -
Indonesia 1 0.879 0.417 1.119 0.329 - -
Malaysia 1 1.032 0.358 0.786 0.457 - -
Mexico 3 1.802 0.131 0.650 0.628 - -
Norway 2 5.636 0.001 *** (+) 3.250 0.023 ** (+) 0.561 0.455
Russia 1 3.594 0.030 ** (+) 2.533 0.083 * (-) 8.517 0.004 ***
U.S. 2 0.175 0.913 8.984 0.000 *** (+) 0.024 0.876
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Table 3.21: Asymmetric effects of real oil prices on oil production.
∆lnP (+)i,t ∆lnP
(−)
i,t ϑ
(+) =
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) ϑ(−) Prob.
Algeria 2 0.204 0.894 3.426 0.018 ** (+) 0.014 0.907
Angola 1 - - - - - -
Ecuador 1 0.543 0.582 1.483 0.230 - -
Iran 4 0.141 0.982 0.787 0.561 - -
Kuwait 2 1.787 0.152 2.178 0.093 * (+) 0.021 0.884
Libya 1 4.253 0.017 ** (-) 3.681 0.029 ** (+) 6.511 0.012 **
Nigeria 1 0.207 0.813 1.497 0.227 - -
Saudi Arabia 2 1.243 0.296 2.756 0.044 ** (+) 0.003 0.958
Venezuela 4 0.436 0.823 0.200 0.962 - -
Brazil 1 1.893 0.154 1.449 0.238 - -
Canada 2 3.819 0.011 ** (-) 1.106 0.348 6.777 0.010 **
Colombia 4 1.266 0.281 1.393 0.229 - -
Egypt 1 0.077 0.926 0.597 0.552 - -
Indonesia 1 0.477 0.621 2.591 0.078 * (-) 1.142 0.287
Malaysia 1 0.783 0.459 1.126 0.327 - -
Mexico 3 0.900 0.465 1.657 0.162 - -
Norway 2 0.903 0.441 1.747 0.159 - -
Russia 1 0.270 0.764 0.618 0.540 - -
U.S. 2 2.400 0.070 * (+) 5.008 0.002 *** (-) 5.354 0.022 **
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Table 3.22: Asymmetric effects of real oil prices on oil production.
ECT
(+)
t−1 ECT
(−)
t−1
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) θ(+) = θ(−) Prob.
Malaysia 1 1.002 0.318 4.036 0.046 ** (+) 4.057 0.019 **
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Notes to the Tables of Chapter 3
Table 3.1
Frequency and fraction up (down) denote the mean frequency expressed in
months of oil production changes and the fraction of oil production increases
(decreases), respectively. Average size denotes the mean size of oil production
changes (percentage over previous value).
Table 3.2
See notes to Table 3.1.
Table 3.3
See notes to Table 3.1.
Table 3.6
Reported are the results obtained by estimating the followingmodel on the basis
of simulated data: lnqt = β0 + β1lnDt + β2lnPt + t. *** (**, *) denote rejection of
the null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically not different from zero at
1% (5%, 10%) significance level.
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Table 3.7
Reported are the results obtained by estimating the followingmodel on the basis
of simulated data: ∆lnqt = β0+β1∆lnDt+β2∆lnPt+t. *** (**, *) denote rejection
of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically not different from zero
at 1% (5%, 10%) significance level.
Table 3.12
Presented are the t values of α̂2 in the following equations:
∆ ln yt = α+ α1 · trend+ α2lnyt−1 +
∑p
t−i βi∆ ln yt−i + t (variables in levels)
∆2 ln yt = α + α1 · trend + α2∆lnyt−1 +
∑p
t−i βi∆
2 ln yt−i + t (variables in log-
first differences). The procedure proposed by [126] is adopted. t denotes that a
linear trend is included in the above equations. The number of lags to include
in the regression is chosen by minimizing the Schwarz-Bayesian Information
Criterion. *** (**, *) denote that the null hypothesis that H0 : α̂ = 0 can be
rejected given 1% (5%, 10%) significance levels. Critical values computed by
[124] are employed.
Table 3.13
See notes to Table 3.12.
Table 3.14
Least squares estimates of the equation lnqit = a0 + a1lnDt + a2lnPt + νt are
reported. *** (**, *) denote rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is
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statistically not different from zero at 1% (5%, 10%) significance level.
Table 3.15
Reported are the results from ADF tests on the residuals of long-run equations
(see equation 3.8). The number of lags to include in the regression is chosen
by minimizing the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion. *** (**, *) denote
rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically not different
from zero at 1% (5%, 10%) significance level. Critical values computed by [127]
are employed.
Table 3.16
Presented are the results from the estimation of short-run dynamics of oil pro-
duction (see equations 3.5 to 3.10). For each country the final specification is
chosen according to the algorithm presented in Section 3.3.2. *** (**, *) denote re-
jection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically not different from
zero at 1% (5%, 10%) significance level. The number of lags of ARDL and EC
Models is selected on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (see [128]).
Table 3.17
See notes to Table 3.16.
Table 3.18
See notes to Table 3.16.
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Table 3.19
Presented are the F− statistic tests that all regression coefficients associated with
world oil demand and real oil prices are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that: H0 : γ1 =
γ2 = . . . = γn = 0 and H0 : ϑ1 = ϑ2 = . . . = ϑn = 0 can be rejected given a 1%
(5%, 10%) significance level. These tests are based on the estimates presented
in Tables 3.16 to 3.18. In columns five and eight the sign of the relationship
between oil production and total demand (or real oil prices) based on coefficients
βD =
γ1+γ2+...+γn
1−β1−β2−...−βn and βPi =
ϑ1+ϑ2+...+ϑn
1−β1−β2−...−βn is reported.
Table 3.20
Presented are the F− statistic tests that all regression coefficients associated with
world oil demand increases and decreases are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that the
null hypotheses H0 : γ
(+)
1 = γ
(+)
2 = . . . = γ
(+)
n = 0 and H0 : γ
(−)
1 = γ
(−)
2 = . . . =
γ
(−)
n = 0 can be rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) significance level. Columns seven
and eight report the results of F -test over the null hypothesis that:
∑
i γ
(+)
2 =∑
i γ
(−)
2 .
Table 3.21
Presented are the F− statistic tests that all regression coefficients associated with
real oil price increases and decreases are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that the null
hypotheses H0 : ϑ
(+)
1 = ϑ
(+)
2 = . . . = ϑ
(+)
n = 0 and H0 : ϑ
(−)
1 = ϑ
(−)
2 = . . . = ϑ
(−)
n =
0 can be rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) significance level. Columns seven and
eight report the results of F -test over the null hypothesis that:
∑
i ϑ
(+)
2 =
∑
i ϑ
(−)
2 .
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Table 3.22
Presented are the F− statistic tests that long-run equilibrium adjustment pa-
rameters associated to the positive and negative components of the long-run
equilibrium relationship are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that the null hypotheses
H0 : θ
(+) = 0 and H0 : θ(−)0 can be rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) significance
level. Columns seven and eight report the results of F -test over the null hypoth-
esis that: θ(+) = θ(−).
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